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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Investing in Innovation: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry
by
Kira Ellen Stearns
Doctor of Philosophy in Management
University of California, Los Angeles, 2020
Professor Melvin Keith Chen, Co-Chair
Professor Marvin B. Lieberman, Co-Chair
This dissertation explores the role that organizations play in bringing scientific innova-
tions to society. Chapter 1 situates this work in the current landscape of innovation research
and motivates the need for further research on this topic. Chapter 2 explores the role that
failure, both technological and regulatory, plays in understanding how organizations make
future investments in innovative projects. I find that following FDA rejection, biopharma-
ceutical firms become significantly less likely to further invest in unrelated products already
under development. However, they experience a higher proportion of future successes, as
they redirect investment into less risky innovations. In contrast, I find no evidence of these
effects in response to technological failures at the end of clinical trials, suggesting that this
effect is not driven by the loss of firm value nor does it support a traditional Bayesian updat-
ing framework. Rather, these findings are consistent with the idea that there is a difference
between failure at the technological level versus failure at the decision making level.
Chapter 3 illustrates how the boundaries of an organization influence the type of inno-
vations in which organizations do and not choose to invest following a sudden reshuffling
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of consumer demand. I demonstrate that a sudden increase in market size (and therefore
expected revenue) increases an established firm’s propensity to make larger investments in
products in their pipeline that are less likely to receive approval. However, I find that this
result only holds for those organizations that diversify into fewer therapeutic spaces and are
additionally more centralized. I theorize that, in line with findings from organizational eco-
nomics and internal capital allocation inefficiency, this is due to management having greater
control over resource allocation decisions in more centralized firms.
Finally, Chapter 4 studies how the type of innovation pursued may affect market outcomes
and competitive interactions between organizations. Using drug repurposing as a research
context, I explore how the repurposing of a pharmaceutical drug for a new disease impacts its
sales, and the sales of its competitors, for other approved uses. By leveraging variation in the
combination of diseases that one drug treats and the timing of those disease approvals, I find
a positive spillover effect of repurposing on sales of the drug for other diseases and this effect
also spills over into the drug’s close competitors. Furthermore, I find that this growth in
sales comes at the expense of competitors further away in therapeutic type. These findings
have important implications for a pharmaceutical firm’s R&D strategy and the strategic
responses to be made by competitors.
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Chapter 1 Innovation and the Organization
The links between innovation and economic growth are largely undisputed. From Schum-
peter’s discussions of creative destruction to Solow’s conception of technological progress,
scholars have stressed the importance of continual product and process innovations on a
dynamic economy. However, innovations do not magically appear within society. New in-
novations, both in products or in process, are the result of people or organizations making
deliberate choices about what they will explore and how they will explore it.
The literature on innovation spans many social science disciplines and encompasses many
research traditions. This research includes studies of lone inventors, studies of patents and
property rights, and studies of knowledge dispersion among communities. A subtopic re-
ceiving increased attention is the role of organizations, both for profit and not-for-profit, in
innovation. While charismatic visionaries receive the majority of media attention, a large
amount of invention and innovation takes place within the confines of an organization. In
these cases, the resources and capabilities of the organization play an important role in bring-
ing innovations from conception to market. Furthermore, these organizations have myriad
choices for how they will develop and market their next technology. They could develop it in
house or license the intellectual property from elsewhere. They can have their scientists and
engineers work together in centralized campuses or as smaller decentralized units. They can
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choose to build on a previous technology or develop something entirely new. These choices
have impacts not only for the fate of the organization, but for the well-being of a society.
This dissertation contains three studies that examine how organizations make decisions
regarding the types of innovation in which they will invest and the competitive outcomes
of such decisions. These studies are linked in the following three ways. First, all studies
concern the development of profit-enhancing medical innovations within a profit maximizing
firm. Secondly, all chapters acknowledge that choosing where to allocate innovative resources
represents a series of tradeoffs for firms. In choosing to pursue one line of research and
development, an organization is sacrificing gains that could be made in another line. And
lastly, all three chapters focus on the product development aspect of innovation. While many
studies in the innovation literature look at intermediate measures like patents or trademarks,
this study looks specifically at new consumer products right before or right after they reach
market.
Finally, the industry explored in all three chapters is the biopharmaceutical industry,
where the chief source of a firm’s competitive advantage is in its ability to bring innovative
new therapies to consumers. Therefore, efficient and effective decision making by managers
within these companies is an important capability. Though this industry follows a highly
regulated procedure for bringing products to market, I believe lessons learned in exploring
the decisions made can be applied broadly across innovative organizations. Issues explored in
the following three chapters, including responses to failure, the effects of demand reshuffling,
and the repurposing of technologies are topics any high-tech firm may find itself grappling
with.
2
Chapter 2 Organizational Responses to Failure and
Rejection
2.1 Introduction
Failure is widespread in many important industries and interactions, and it can take many
forms. It can be highly detailed and personalized, as in a promotion rejection, or lack
thorough explanation, as in a prototype failure. It can signal to budding entrepreneurs how
they measure up against their peers when they win a business plan competition, or signal to
them how they measure up against a subjective threshold when they fail to receive funding
from venture capitalists.
One common type of failure that has received limited consideration despite its preva-
lence for innovative firms and entrepreneurs is rejection from an external party. For example,
firms will compete for consulting contracts that they either win or lose, inventors will submit
patents that are either accepted or rejected, and employees will apply for promotions that
are either granted or deferred. A unique aspect of rejection when compared to traditional
definitions of failure is that firms or individuals must explicitly solicit this feedback, often
through applications or proposals. Therefore, these individuals likely possess an a priori
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belief about the quality of their product, invention, or application and therefore their chance
of success. For managers receiving negative feedback, or “failing”, they learn not just about
an external party’s assessment of the focal product or application, but about her own ability
to make accurate judgments about its likelihood of success. These ramifications are par-
ticularly interesting, and still unexplored despite evidence suggesting that people respond
differently to failure depending on the source.
This chapter will explore the role of regulatory rejection on a firm’s future investment
behavior in unrelated technologies that are currently under development within the firm. I
find evidence suggesting that rejection of an innovation changes a manager’s propensity to
make further investments in their next several projects. Additionally, I show that this shift
in decision making changes the type of projects a firm will invest in next. To my knowledge,
this is the first study exploring how rejection from regulators affects both future investment
behavior and future product development successes.
I explore these issues empirically in the context of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries where firms must receive Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval to
market their product in the United States.1 Because of the R&D-intensive nature of firms
in these industries, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries have been a popular
setting for studies on firm behavior in innovation (DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Henderson
and Cockburn, 1994; Krieger, 2018).2 Before applying for FDA approval, firms make a series
1Regulatory approval to market and sell products is common in many facets of the healthcare sector,
including medical devices.
2Additionally, the hesitancy of pharmaceutical firms to terminate lower-quality R&D efforts (leading to
inefficient resource allocation) has gained attention within the industry. A vice president of Novartis has
lamented that they “always cling to products a year longer than [they] should” ((Lam, 2004): 1). Ken
Kaitin, the director of the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, suspects this failure to let go of
projects is built on what he calls “selfish-team syndrome,” defined as the situation in which “a group that is
developing a particular drug makes biased decisions - for example, trying to save the project when it should be
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of investments in the development of their product. Furthermore, in these industries, the
majority of firms are developing many products at the same time and therefore are managing
a pipeline of potential products at various stages of development. This will be crucial for
this research in that it allows me to observe the trajectories of research projects already in
progress at the time of one product’s rejection. I begin by proposing a theoretical framework
that describes how firms make these series of investment decisions in their products that are
midway through development; that is, after the firm has already developed a belief about
the quality of the project following years of collecting information about its performance.
I then explore how unanticipated rejections by the FDA affect the firm’s beliefs about its
other pharmaceutical products under development and how the firm chooses to invest in new
rounds of product development.
To estimate the effects of rejection, I compile a large dataset on firm investment decisions
in drug development spanning nearly 20 years. These data include information on the firm
developing the drug and many characteristics of the molecule under development, including
the disease it is intended to treat. With these data, I am able to leverage within-firm variation
to explore firm behavior both before and after the negative event. In addition, I collect data
to control for demand conditions, product novelty, and other factors that may influence a
firm’s investment decisions. I also research and compile data describing regulatory decisions
by the FDA on every project submitted for review. While the vast majority of applications
eventually receive approval (95% of applications submitted in my sample), in some cases the
FDA identifies weaknesses that cannot be overcome and the project must be terminated. It
killed - because the team’s reputation is tied to the drug’s success or because the team members have become
emotionally attached to the project” ((Bonabeau, 2002): 115). Another biotechnology executive proclaims
that “questionable clinical data tends to get overlooked because there is such a push to do something” (Lam,
2004): 2).
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is these “terminal rejections” that I will use to explore the effects of negative feedback on
future investment decisions.
One challenge in estimating the effects of rejection on a recipient is in causal identifica-
tion. That is, the act of choosing to solicit feedback from an external party may be correlated
with future behavior patterns, causing the problem of non-random assignment to treatment.
Therefore, to causally identify the effects of the negative feedback, I modify an identification
approach first proposed by Blankshain et al. (2013). They argue that “surprising” nega-
tive regulatory feedback can be treated as an external shock. For this study, I will identify
surprise negative regulatory feedback by collecting data on industry experts’ predictions of
drug quality at the time of the FDA application. I then employ within-firm variation and a
difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of plausibly exogenous rejections on
future investment decisions. If I find no change in a firm’s propensity to continue investing
in other unrelated projects (while employing fixed effects and controls for relevant prod-
uct characteristics), one could conclude that this negative feedback does not fundamentally
change a firm’s investment strategies. A discrete change in the investment decisions of a firm
would imply that this type of negative feedback does have spillover impacts on innovation.
In the empirical analyses, I find that immediately following surprising regulatory rejec-
tions, managers become over 20% less likely to continue funding other, unrelated products
under development and that this effect persists for the next several projects that reach the
critical decision stage. In addition, I find a “raising the bar” effect. Because firms discon-
tinue the development of more risky (lower probability of approval) products, they experience
better overall performance of those future projects in which they do choose to invest. In
traditional studies in learning from failure, observing an increase in the probability of ap-
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proval for projects may lead one to believe the firm is “learning” from failure. Here, I can
demonstrate that what appears to be improved firm performance is actually the result of
more selective investing.
Finally, I show that the effect of negative regulatory feedback makes firms less likely to
invest in projects for more novel drugs, that is, those treating rare disease or demonstrat-
ing significant improvements over drugs already on the market. This finding demonstrates
that programs put into place to encourage more innovative investment do not mitigate the
retreat from investment seen following receipt of an FDA rejection. In additional analy-
ses, I demonstrate evidence for why these results are unlikely to stem only from financial
constraints experienced by a firm that has lost expected future revenue. I therefore con-
clude that this type of feedback leads to a change in a firm’s appetite for making late stage
investments in other innovations.
This study provides two important insights. First, I demonstrate that rejection from
entry regulators leads firms to become more conservative in future investments in unrelated
technologies. However, those in which they do invest are technologies that are much more
likely to eventually receive regulatory approval. I show that this change in behavior persists
for several projects in the future but does eventually revert back to normal patterns of invest-
ment when controlling for firm effects. This supports the hypothesis that entry regulation
may depress innovation, and especially more novel innovation, from the private sector. Sec-
ondly, while the firm does achieve a higher proportion of future products receiving approval
following full investment, these products are likely to be more incremental rather than novel
innovations. This is further illustrated in an analysis exploring post-rejection investment on
projects that have already received intermediate-stage positive regulatory feedback. Prod-
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ucts receiving early feedback from the FDA are more likely to be novel innovations (and
therefore qualify for early monitoring and often subsidized development). Following rejec-
tion, these novel products become over 60% less likely to receive important investments in
development, as compared to novel products in which the firm invested before rejection.
These findings have implications for both strategy and policy scholars. If the role of
policy makers is to incentivize innovation in the private sector, these findings suggest the
importance of developing mechanisms that mitigate the number of unanticipated rejections.
Additionally, these findings make important contributions to the strategy literature in learn-
ing from failure. Current empirical research has suggested that firms may respond to negative
feedback in several ways, and this may have heterogenous impacts on firm performance. In
this setting, I am able to demonstrate how negative feedback leads managers to update their
prior beliefs about the success of other unrelated projects and that this may lead to higher
perceived performance on certain dimensions. However, I am able to demonstrate that what
may appear to be learning in certain contexts is actually a function of increased selectivity
in the risks a firm is willing to take. In the next section, I will discuss these literatures in
more depth.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper makes several contributions to a research agenda that is of interest to both
management and public policy researchers. In this section, I present a cursory overview of
related work.
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2.2.1 Related literature on failure in innovation
This paper adds additional insight to studies on firm adaptation in response to failures in
innovation. The conditions under which firms can learn from failure constitute a research
stream that is growing in prominence (see, e.g., Guler, 2018; Khanna et al., 2016; Klingebiel,
2018; Maslach, 2016). However, conclusions regarding a firm’s ability to respond to failure
have been mixed. One of the difficulties in estimating responses, which may therefore lead to
these differences, is the inability to examine the responses to different types of failures both
within and across firms. The literature on firm responses to rare, publicly visible failures
often relies heavily on case studies (Christianson et al., 2009; Harding et al., 2002; Lampel
et al., 2009; Madsen, 2009). Additionally, although exploring firm responses to frequent but
small failures allows more data and for comparisons across firms, the definition of failure
in this case is narrow. Furthermore, in the case of frequent, small failures, it is often the
case that the manager itself had recognized the failure and not that it was decreed by an
external party. One may hypothesize that firms capable of understanding when they failed
likely have capabilities that make them different from firms that do not know when to admit
failure.
It is largely believed that organizations can learn more from failure than from success
(Haunschild et al., 2015; Madsen and Desai, 2010). Given the preponderance of failures
generated by experimentation and innovation, several scholars have explored whether and
how failures in innovation can lead to better future outcomes for the firm. Two papers
closely related to this one have explored how the nature of the failed product (whether it
was in a new or risky domain) leads to differences in the firm’s response. Using data from
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the mutual fund industry, Eggers and Suh (2019) find that failures of products launched in
new domains leads the firm to retreat, while failures of products launched in experienced
domains leads the firm to search both locally and distantly for solutions. Maslach (2016)
also explores how the type of failed products affects the firm’s adaptations. Using data from
the medical device industry, he finds that firms are more likely to persist with failed products
when they were incremental innovations. Both studies suggest that firm adaptation depends
on the firms ability to learn from failure, with the finding that firms are more likely able to
learn when the failure is in a domain with which they have had past experience.
Because of the prevalence of failure in innovative industries, there is a rich literature in
organizational learning that explores its effect on future search. However, for an outside
researcher to observe an innovation failure within an R&D department, it must be the case
that the manager has judged the product to be a failure. That is, personnel (often scientists
or engineers) must be able to recognize that the product will not be successful on the market
and then manage the termination of that product. There is no paucity of evidence that this
can be a difficult and often non-incentivized task for managers (Biyalogorsky et al., 2006;
March and Shapira, 1987; Simester and Zhang, 2010). Therefore, much of the literature on
nfailure in innovation explores the case where the firm recognizes that its product is low
quality and takes actions to terminate it.
One limitation of this literature has been the difficulty in compiling data on a firm’s inno-
vation failures. In previous literature, two main approaches have been used. One approach
has been to measure failures in innovation at the patent level by looking at metrics such
as patent discontinuations (Khanna et al., 2016; Serrano, 2010). While patents are a good
measure of early-stage innovation, they have limitations as a proxy for innovative product
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development. The other approach has been to look at failures of innovative products once
they reach the market and face the ultimate judgment by consumers or other external critics.
Literature in this realm explores firm responses to events such as the addition of a drug safety
label (Higgins et al., 2018), the count of adverse events (Maslach, 2016), or a product recall
(Freedman et al., 2012). While these events provide useful information on how firms react
to negative external criticism following market entry, the effect is likely tangled with effects
generated from changing consumer sentiment and changes in immediate revenue. Therefore,
it is difficult to disentangle exclusively the effect of the information inherent in the feedback.
2.2.2 Related literature on individual responses to feedback from
gatekeepers
Additionally, this study adds to the literature on responses to feedback from a “gatekeeper.”
Situations in which individuals receive performance feedback, and in which performance
must reach a certain threshold for continuation, are pervasive. Consultants pitch projects
to potential clients and government agencies. Engineers build prototypes and test them in
the lab. And actors audition for roles in front of small groups of producers. Owing to the
prevalence of negative feedback in these situations, a growing body of research is beginning
to address how this particular type of feedback may impact the future trajectories of its
recipient. In studying interim feedback in a tournament model, Ederer (2010) demonstrates
that negative feedback may be demotivating for individuals who therefore become aware of
asymmetries between themselves and their competitors.
Despite several theoretical contributions to the feedback literature, there is a paucity of
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empirical evidence of these predictions. In one of the few empirical studies, Gross (2017)
uses data from a commercial logo design tournament and finds empirical support for Ederer’s
theory. He finds negative feedback reduces future participation in the design contest but
improves the quality of future designs. Wooten and Ulrich (2017) come to similar conclusions
after implementing a field experiment designed to give artists different types of intermediate
feedback on their designs. In general, they find that directed feedback improves the average
quality of submitted entries, and the variance of quality declines.
Feedback also plays a role in entrepreneurship and the development of new ventures. In
new venture competitions, founders present their business plans to a panel of judges who
score and rank the competitors. In studying these data, Howell (2018) finds that negative
feedback regarding one’s intermediate rank in the competition leads to increased rates of
product abandonment among those ranked more poorly. In contrast, Wagner (2017) uses a
similar setting but finds that when some founders receive unsolicited qualitative feedback on
their ventures, they raise more money in the future and are more likely to survive. These sets
of studies are important in that they demonstrate how the nature of feedback an entrepreneur
receives prior to entering the market may lead to heterogeneous future outcomes.
2.2.3 Related literature on regulation and innovation
Finally, this study contributes to literature exploring the effects of regulation on innovation.
Since the early 1970s, economists and policy scholars have debated whether or not regulation
encourages or discourages firms to innovate. Many of the early scholars, including Peltzman
(1975) and Wardell and Lasagna (1975), argued that regulation inhibited innovation and
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therefore decreased consumer welfare. These conclusions were also suggested by comparisons
of the growth of countries with many regulations to those with few regulations (Crafts, 2006).
In his analysis of new drug introductions following the Kefauver-Harris Amendment (which
created the United States Food and Drug Administration as we know it today), Wiggins
(1981) explored the change in marketed new drugs and determined that these regulations
decreased new product introductions by 52%.
However, by the 1990s, scholars (including Michael Porter and Claas van der Linde in
1995) were suggesting that regulation may actually stimulate innovation. For example, regu-
lations including patent protections likely created incentives to invest in R&D because firms
knew they could appropriate value from their innovations. In addition, antitrust regulation
may also stimulate innovation if firms believe they must innovate to maintain a competi-
tive advantage. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that regulation restricting entry
may also have a positive effect on firm innovation. In exploring the effects of environmen-
tal regulation on innovation, Jaffe and Palmer (1997) find that environmental compliance
expenditures have a significant and positive effect on future R&D expenditures, though not
on patent counts. Pickman (1998) and Newell et al. (1999) also find a positive effect of
environmental regulation on innovation. The current literature finds many differing effects
of environmental regulations on innovation depending on the regulation studied.
Additional studies of regulation on innovation have explored issues such as the possibility
of first-mover advantages or disadvantages in industries marked by regulated entry. If regula-
tory requirements of product entry become stricter as more products populate a therapeutic
class, firms may be discouraged from further innovating within a crowded class. Carpenter
et al. (2010) find that pharmaceuticals entering a certain therapeutic category first tend to
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have decreased time in regulatory review, suggesting the presence of a first-mover advantage.
However, Stern (2017) finds the opposite in the medical device industry.
2.3 Setting: The Biopharmaceutical Industry
The setting of this study is the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.3 I study this
industry for a few reasons. First, the chief source of a competitive advantage for a pharmaceu-
tical firm is its ability to innovate, that is, introduce new products that have been approved
by a government’s regulating body.4 Therefore, efficient and effective decision making by
managers within these companies is an important capability. Second, pharmaceutical firms
undergo a standardized routine of product development. This makes for ease of comparison
both among and within firms at various stages of product development. And finally, the
industry is important not only to the global economy but to the health and productivity of
its citizens. In the United States, the pharmaceutical industry alone made up 1.9% of GDP
in 2016 (United States Department of Commerce, 2016). Additionally, there is evidence that
the introduction of new pharmaceuticals can benefit the labor market (Garthwaite, 2012),
and decrease the burden on hospitals to provide care (Lichtenberg, 2001, 2007).
The ability to terminate low-quality projects quickly is an important capability for man-
agers overseeing drug development projects (Guler, 2018; Lendrem et al., 2015). The costs
of drug development have been increasing over time, and costs for developing a drug increase
exponentially as firms continue through each phase of research and development. Estimates
3While pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies differ in a few ways, for ease of exposition I will
consider all firms within these two industries to be pharmaceutical firms.
4In this paper, I will only consider approvals by the United State’s Food and Drug Administration, as is
common in the literature.
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for the total R&D costs of one approved drug now top over $1 billion in 2013 dollars (DiMasi
et al., 2016). The research and development of new molecules (which can eventually become
marketed drugs) consists of two distinct parts: discovery research and product development.
In the discovery research phase, scientists synthesize drugs and conduct preclinical testing.
Discovery research often takes between 3 to 6 years. The second part, product development,
is the longest and most expensive part of the drug creation process, and will be the focus of
this paper. It has been estimated to take an average of 6.5 years (Mestre-Ferrandiz et al.,
2016) and can cost upwards of $80 million (Sertkaya et al., 2016).
Drug development is broken out into three phases of clinical trials: Phase I, Phase II,
and Phase III. Phase I is the shortest and consists of a firm testing its molecule on 20-100
healthy volunteers to confirm the safety of the molecule. If that is found to be satisfactory,
the firm can move to Phase II. Phase II is the first real study of the drug’s effectiveness on
sick volunteers.5 Phase III trials are often longer and more expensive versions of Phase II
trials, involving up to 3,000 patients, and costing over three times as much (Lam, 2004).
A study by the Manhattan Institute suggests that Phase III trials can make up over 90%
of the drug’s total development costs and represents the largest contributor to the growing
costs of drug development (Roy, 2012). After having completed Phase III trials, the firm will
submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) or a Biologics Licensing Application (“BLA”) to
the United States’ Food and Drug Administration for review. This application summarizes
all of the data generated during preclinical and clinical trials. The FDA is expected to
respond to most standard NDAs within 10 months of filing.6 Only after a drug has been
5By Phase II, issues around safety are generally resolved. However proving effectiveness can be more
difficult, with more ambiguous requirements (Pak et al., 2015).
6This follows the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 (Ciociola et al., 2014).
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approved by the FDA can it be sold and marketed in the United States.7
For this paper, I specifically consider a firm’s decision to invest in Phase III clinical trials,
that is, to move a product from Phase II to Phase III. Here, I am defining a product to be a
molecule-indication dyad. A molecule is the specific drug given to patients and the indication
is the specific disease the molecule is targeting (e.g. type II diabetes, non-small cell lung
cancer).8 Many molecules can treat one indication and one molecule can potentially treat
many indications. However, a firm must do a separate Phase III trial for every indication it
is trying to get approved for a certain molecule. Without an indication specific approval, a
firm cannot market that drug for a specific condition. Therefore, a firm may have a different
innovation strategy for a molecule it is trying to market for multiple indications than for a
molecule hypothesized to treat only one indication.
I choose to explore Phase III investment because it represents the largest resource alloca-
tion decision a firm will make in the drug development process. Firms that can terminate a
low-quality project before Phase III will still have refrained from making the most costly in-
vestment in the product’s development. Therefore, one could consider a firm that terminates
a product’s development before Phase III to be one that demonstrates more risk aversion
than a firm that chooses to continue with that same product. In addition, despite being
the final step in the drug development program, Phase III trials are still very risky. Recent
evidence finds the average probability of a molecule going from Phase III to FDA approval
is between 57-71% and can be as low as 34% for certain therapeutic categories (Wong et al.,
7While a firm cannot market a drug for a disease for which it has not been approved, a doctor can still
prescribe it to a patient for whichever disease she deems fitting. This is called “off-label” prescribing and
while it likely has some implications for firm strategy, they are outside the scope of this paper.
8An indication can sometimes be a smaller subset within what is commonly thought of as a disease. For
example, with the rise of gene-targeted therapies, an indication could be “Ovarian cancer on the BRCA-1
mutation.”
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2018). For biologics, the probability is even lower. However, these probabilities are more
optimistic than the overall success rate of a product beginning at preclinical trials, which
can be as low as 3%. This is certainly intuitive. As a drug development program transitions
through all of the phases of clinical trials, the researchers get clearer information signals and
will therefore only invest in Phase III trials for those molecules with the highest chances of
success.
While the majority of NDAs are eventually approved by the FDA, occasionally a firm
will be denied approval by the FDA. When the FDA rejects a New Drug Application, it
sends the firm a Complete Response Letter (CRL).9 Receipt of a CRL constitutes a large
setback for the firm. Companies are required by law to disclose to their investors if they
have received a CRL, however the exact contents of the CRL are rarely made public.10 Upon
receipt of a CRL, the firm has a few options. If possible, a CRL will detail the deficiencies of
an application and offer a path forward. In this case, the firm has the option to redo some
clinical trials and collect new data that will satisfy the concerns of the FDA. If the firm or
the FDA determines the deficiencies are insurmountable, the firm will withdraw the NDA
and terminate the project.11 While the first case may be interesting in some contexts, in
this study I am only interested in CRLs that result in termination of the project.
There are many reasons one may believe that firms receiving rejections from the FDA
9The FDA did not begin using CRLs for small molecules until 2008, to replace what had previously
been either “Approvable” letters or “Non-approvable” letters. They had been standard for biologics since
1998. For consistency throughout this paper, I will refer to a Non-approval letter received before 2008 to be
analogous to a CRL.
10This is illustrated in the rejection of ImClone’s cancer drug Erbitux, which received a “Refuse to File”
letter from the FDA given the badly flawed application. While the CEO tried to downplay the FDA’s
concerns to investors, when excerts from the letter were leaked to the press, detailing the many deficiencies
of the clinical trial design, the company found itself in turmoil (Prudhome, 2013).
11The firm also has a third option to schedule a hearing with the FDA. Within 60 days of the hearing, the
FDA will either approve or reject the application.
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had submitted an NDA or BLA while expecting approval. The process of filing an NDA
or BLA is time consuming and can even involve the hiring of consultants. Therefore, it
is not a decision that the firm makes haphazardly. Additionally, because the receipt of a
CRL can impact firm value, it is unlikely a firm would consume resources or undergo this
risk if they did not believe their drug at least had a very good chance of being approved.
Interviews with industry insiders and company press releases suggest this is largely true.
For example, when the company PTC Therapeutics received a CRL for a drug used to treat
Duchenne muscular dystrophy, the CEO stated that he was “extremely disappointed for
the Duchenne community” and “strongly disagree[d] with the agency’s conclusions” (Press
release, 11/28/2018). However, to be conservative, in Section 2.5.4, I will explain the method
used to segment out FDA rejections that are plausibly truly surprising to the firm and
industry.
Industry experts have expressed in interviews that rejection from the FDA can be hum-
bling for both the scientists and the senior management within the firm. Even large and
experienced firms can make fundamental errors resulting in the non-approval of their prod-
uct.12 For example Astrazeneca received a CRL for their product Numax to treat respiratory
syncytial virus due to issues in trial design that resulted in uncertainty regarding the effi-
cacy results (Press Release, 2010). In fact, I will demonstrate evidence that the majority
of these rejections are to large firms with vast amounts of experience developing drugs. Ac-
cording to a former Vice President at Bristol-Myers-Squibb, the receipt of a CRL can “beget
soul searching” within the firm. Therefore, there is reason to believe, and as suggested by
12As one decision maker in a pharmaceutical company explained, “Project teams can be very possessive
and defensive of their project that can make it a very challenging situation when tough decisions need to be
made on the continued viability of the project” (Donelan et al. (2015): 325).
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Haunschild and Rhee (2004), that firm adaptations made in response to a CRL may be
different from adaptations made in response to different types of innovation failures, such as
late-stage project terminations handled internally.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data on Product Development Decisions
To empirically explore the effect negative feedback has on future firm risk taking, I first
create a dataset that includes pipeline-level information from Informa’s BioMedTracker. The
BioMedTracker database provides a timeline of a drug’s development from Phase II trials to
either approval or termination. This is where I collect data on relevant event dates (here,
date the Phase II clinical trials ended, date the project was fully terminated, and/or date of
FDA approval). Because I assume FDA approval to be the firm’s end goal in this analysis, I
treat clinical trials that were terminated in the United States but moved toward development
for another country’s market as terminated. I am also able to collect a rich amount of data on
product characteristics, such as intended indication and inclusion in government sponsored
programs from this database. The BioMedTracker database contains data on Phase II and
Phase III clinical trials for a wide range of firms, both public and private, from around the
world.13
Given the vast amount of mergers and acquisitions among pharmaceutical and biotechnol-
ogy companies, it is important to determine which company owned and was making decisions
13While there is some information on Phase I trials and preclinical research, the data on the exact dates
of initiation or termination is less complete. This is because not all Phase I clinical trials are required to be
registered.
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about the molecule at the end of Phase II clinical trials. To correctly match the owner of
a drug to the decision maker at Phase II, I create a dataset of mergers and acquisitions
(including product acquisitions) as gleaned from EvaluatePharma, another competitive in-
telligence database. Additional information regarding how I cleaned the data and accounted
for missing information can be found in Appendix A.1.
Average and total R&D expenses for publicly traded firms in the sample, as reported by
Compustat, are displayed in Figure 2.1. From Figure 2.1(a), it is evident total R&D spending
increases over the time period but average spending appears to fall around 2010. Figure
2.1(b) displays the average R&D expenditures for the top ten largest firms (by spending)
in the sample. For these firms, average R&D spending appears to be increasing over time.
However, the fact that average spending stays relatively constant between 2010 and 2015
may suggest the dip in average spending among the full sample may also be a function of
macroeconomic factors like the global recession.
Despite a non-decreasing level of R&D expenditures by pharmaceutical firms, the average
number of FDA approvals for firms in the sample has not monotonically increased over time.
Figure 2.2 illustrates these trends for both the full sample, and the averages for just the top
ten biggest spenders.
Given the importance conditional transition probabilities will play in the regression spec-
ifications, I first explore what these data suggest regarding the probability of investment in
Phase III clinical trials and the probability of approval, given the firm has completed Phase
II clinical trials. Figure 2.3 illustrates these average probabilities for the year in which the
Phase II clinical trial concluded. Interestingly, the probability of investment in Phase III and
the probability of FDA approval appear to move together over time. While one may initially
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Figure 2.1: This figure plots (a) Average and total R&D expenses for the publicly traded
firms in the sample (b) Average R&D expenditures for the top ten largest firms (by spending)
in the sample. Data from Compustat.
hypothesize that the probability of investing in Phase III clinical trials has decreased over
time due to improved technologies leading to better decision making, the fact that average
approval rates have not increased suggest that this may not be the case.
One weakness of a simple graphical approach is that it does not take into account how
characteristics of the drugs pursued over time change. As described above, transition prob-
abilities are historically different depending on the therapeutic class and are often heteroge-
neous within class, given the indication pursued and the drug’s mechanism of action.14 In
14The mechanism of action (MOA) is how the drug “works.” Oftentimes, this is consequence of the
drug-receptor interaction.
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Figure 2.2: This figure plots the average number of FDA approval by firm and year for
(1) All Companies in the Sample and (2) Only the Top 10 Firms by R&D Expenditures.
Approvals include NMEs, BLAs, NDAs, and sNDAs. On the x-axis is the year of FDA
approval. Data on R&D expenditures from Compustat. Data on FDA approvals from
BioMedTracker and FDA.gov.
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Figure 2.3: This figure plots the probability over time of (1) investing in Phase III clinical
trials and (2) receiving FDA approval for each molecule having completed Phase II trials for
a specific indication. Data from BioMedTracker and FDA.gov.
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addition, the types of products being developed by an organization, or the number of orga-
nizations which specialize in certain therapeutic classes, may change over time. To explore
this further, I consider four of the largest therapeutic classes in the dataset: Cardiovascu-
lar, Neurology, Oncology, and Endocrine Systems. Figure 2.4 illustrates how the number of
Phase III clinical trials (and the percentage of those resulting in approved products) changes
over time. These graphs illustrate that while oncology was the largest class in 2004, it grew
by nearly 50%, and a larger percentage of those achieved FDA approval. In contrast, the
number of Phase III clinical trials in neurology decreased over time, and the percentage of
those approved became smaller as well.
I also consider the change in transition probability from Phase II to III for those four
classes over time in Figure 2.5. Despite a growth in the number of oncology products reaching
Phase III, the percentage moving from Phase II to Phase III actually decreases over time,
and this is true with nearly all classes. This is likely because as knowledge about the disease
increases over time, firms are able to make better decisions about Phase III investments.
2.4.2 Data on FDA Rejections
As an important addition to these data, I collect information on receipt of Complete Response
Letters (or “Non-Approvables” if it is before 2008) and other forms of rejection by the
FDA that result in termination of the project. Following the collection of historic data on
company interactions with the FDA (and confirmed by interviews with a consultant to this
industry), it becomes clear there a few reasons a company may terminate a project following
an NDA or BLA filing. First, a company may receive a CRL requesting more data to be
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Figure 2.4: This figure illustrates the heterogeneity in the number of Phase III clinical
trials and FDA approvals over time and by therapeutic classes. Those for the four largest
classes are displayed here. Therapeutic class is defined by BioMedTracker. On the x-axis is
the year at the start of Phase III clinical trials. Data from BioMedTracker and FDA.gov.
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Figure 2.5: This figure illustrates the heterogeneity in the proportion of (1) Phase II
clinical trials that continue to Phase III clinical trials and (2) FDA approvals over time and
by therapeutic classes. Those for the four largest classes are displayed here. Therapeutic
class is defined by BioMedTracker. On the x-axis is the year at the end of Phase II clinical
trials. Data from BioMedTracker and FDA.gov.
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collected before the possibility of approval. A firm that is unable to then demonstrate that
the product is approvable (or determines it is too costly) will terminate development of that
drug.15 Secondly, the firm may terminate the project (and withdraw the NDA) if they receive
negative feedback from the FDA advisory committee. The advisory committee is comprised
of external experts who offer advice to the FDA, but do not make finals decisions regarding
product approval. However, a “no” vote from the advisory committee sends a negative
signal about its probability of approval. And finally, the FDA may issue a “Refuse to File”
notice following an NDA or BLA application. The FDA will usually file an application
within 60 days of receipt if the application is complete. A Refuse to File notice is issued
if the application is incomplete. Some application deficiencies are easily correctable, others
are more complex. In the case of insurmountable deficiencies, the company may choose to
terminate the project.
Despite playing an important role in the innovation process in this industry, there have
been few studies done on the role of CRLs, and this is likely because they are not available to
the public. The FDA currently treats them as confidential. Any public knowledge of CRLs
often comes from a firm’s own press release, which many are compelled to make due to US
securities laws requiring companies to disclose any information that may impact an investor’s
decision. However, even press releases are unlikely to give complete information as to why the
FDA rejected a marketing application.16 A study conducted by FDA researchers (who have
access to historical CRLs) find that press releases documenting the failure of an application
15In some instances, firms will re-do trials many times and still not receive an approval from the FDA.
While interesting, these cases are outside the scope of this paper.
16Following Abbvie and Abbot’s receipt of a CRL for Certriad, the investing advice website The Motley
Fool noted that “in typical pharma fashion, the companies didn’t give any indication what problem the FDA
had with Certriad.”
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often omit or give incomplete information regarding the reasoning for that rejection (Lurie
et al., 2015). For example, they find while 48% of issued CRLs note deficiencies in both safety
and efficacy of the product, only 13% of matching press releases divulge this information.
These issues highlight the difficulty in determining the exact characteristics of the product
that caused it to fail.
For this study, I treat all terminations by the firm due to regulatory feedback as effectively
the same. Because the receipt of a CRL is the most common reason for the termination of a
project following an NDA or BLA application, for ease of exposition I will refer to all of these
cases as “terminal CRLs” or “rejections.” I will identify these as cases in the data where one
can see the filing of an NDA followed by the termination of the project without approval.17
Because the data on these types of terminations is not as complete in the 1990s, I subset the
data to only those products for which their Phase II trials were completed between 2000-
2018. However, I find in robustness checks (not presented here) that these results are robust
to various expansions and contractions in the considered time period. Figure 2.6 illustrates
the number of FDA rejections and approvals over time.18 As illustrated, full rejections by
the FDA are very rare in comparison to approvals and appear to be heterogeneous across
time. Wong et al. (2018) similarly find they account for roughly 3% of all NDA applications.
Of the 1,929 companies on which I have collected pipeline data, only 78 have ever received
a terminal CRL (or other negative feedback from the FDA) on a project for which they were
17The FDA may initially reject an application only to have the firm redo the trials and eventually receive
approval. While a potentially interesting phenomenon, I do not include those as failures for the purposes of
this paper.
18The number of approvals is higher than normally discussed in the popular press because these tables
include counts of NMEs (new molecular entities), sNDAs (which include new indications or reformulations
approved for an already approved NME) and biologics. In discussions regarding the number of FDA approved
drugs by year, often just NMEs are reported.
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Figure 2.6: This figure displays the aggregate number of FDA approvals and rejections
over time. Approvals include NMEs, BLAs, NDAs, and sNDAs. On the x-axis is the year of
either FDA approval or rejection. Data from BioMedTracker and FDA.gov.
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the lead developer. When looking at failures for the companies involved in development at
any capacity, 142 ever received a terminal CRL. Though initially counter-intuitive, companies
included in this group consist of nearly all of the largest “big pharma” companies that have
had extensive experience compiling NDAs and BLAs. One-hundred percent of the top 10
companies by FDA approved products have received a terminal CRL and over half of the
top 50 firms have received one. This provides some evidence that terminal CRLs are not
necessarily driven by inexperienced firms being unable to meet the FDA requirements for
approval. This is a boon for the researcher though, because these large and experienced
companies provide enough data on investment decisions to make using within-firm variation
feasible for the empirical analyses.
Table 2.1 displays the number of CRLs and approvals by therapeutic class. In comparing
the two, they appear positively correlated. For example, the highest number of CRLs were
issued for oncology products, and this therapeutic class also saw the largest number of
approvals. Additionally, 4.2% of all CRLs were on drugs with “Breakthrough” status, which
is nearly equivalent to the number of Phase II products with Breakthrough status (4.4%).
A slightly higher percentage of products being terminated following rejection were orphan
drugs (24.4%) than the percentage of orphan drugs at Phase II (12.6%). However, given the
benefits that accrue with approval of an orphan drug (namely, extra years of exclusivity) it
is not surprising that firms would be more likely to take bigger risks with those products.
In the regressions, I will control for all of these characteristics of the product.
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Table 2.1: Number of CRLs and Approvals by Therapeutic Class
2000 - 2018
Therapeutic Class Number of CRLs Number of Approvals
Allergy 1 44
Autoimmune/immunology 11 254
Cardiovascular 14 213
Dermatology 14 60
ENT/Dental 0 2
Endocrine 14 265
Gastroenterology 3 66
Hematology 7 111
Infectious disease 13 442
Metabolic 6 55
Neurology 25 320
Obstetrics/Gynecology 0 20
Oncology 28 374
Ophthalmology 8 92
Orthopedics 0 3
Psychiatry 6 142
Renal 0 15
Respiratory 2 86
Rheumatology 1 8
Urology 1 33
This table compares the number of FDA Rejections (CRLs) to the number of FDA
Approvals by Therapeutic Class across the time period of this study. Therapeutic
Class is defined by BioMedTracker.
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2.5 Methods
2.5.1 Main Empirical Model
If firms become more risk-averse following rejection by the FDA, one should see a decrease
in the probability of investing in Phase III for the next several products that reach the end
of Phase II clinical trials, the stage at which the firm must decide if it wants to make a large
investment in continuing development. If firms become less risk averse, one should see an
increase in the probability of continuation, ceteris paribus.
To test this finding rigorously, I collect data on investment and termination decisions for
all firms in the data, regardless of whether or not they receive a CRL during the time period.
(However, once I include firm fixed effects in the specifications, the “control” firms should
not impact the coefficient estimate.) I then construct a difference-in-differences econometric
model to estimate the probability of continuation to Phase III clinical trials. I consider this
decision to be a function of properties of the drug, the experience level of the firm, and the
current competitive landscape. The empirical model is described in detail below.
Pr(Phase III|Phase II)ijrt = α0 + βPost-rejectionijrt + ΘXijt + δr + µt + ijrt (2.1)
where X is a vector of Project-time controls. δr and µt represent fixed effects for firm-
therapeutic department and year respectively. Detailed information on variable definition
and construction is in Appendix A.2.
32
To construct a dataset for this estimation, I collect the date for when each Phase II trial
for a molecule-indication ended. This is the date that a firm must make a continuation
or termination decision. I consider the continuation decision for the next product within
that therapeutic research group, so long as it is not the same molecule being applied to
a different indication or affecting the same target. Because many large pharmaceutical
firms have a different key decision maker within each therapeutic class (and are occasionally
even located in separate cities), it is more plausible that failures only impact decisions
made within a therapeutic class. Research by Gaba and Joseph (2013), in a study on
M-form organizations, also finds that negative feedback at the business unit level leads to
improved future performance within that business unit. This assumption will likely not make
a difference for smaller, centralized firms that are likely to specialize in only one therapeutic
class.
If a firm is pursuing several indications for the same molecule, a substantial failure for
one indication may impact the nature of trials for other indications due to information
spillovers about the particular technology. To be as conservative as possible, I throw out
cases of additional work on the same molecule and other drugs that have the same intended
biological target as the rejected drug. Most results are robust to additionally considering
only those next projects in different therapeutic subclasses as well.19
19In these data, a therapeutic class contains on average, five therapeutic subclasses. For example, the
therapeutic class “ophthalmology” contains eight subclasses, including “retinopathy,” “uveitis,” “glaucoma,”
and “corneal conditions.”
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2.5.2 Endogeneity and Identification
One of the challenges in the organizational learning and feedback literatures is the difficulty
in identifying a true causal relationship between the feedback and subsequent firm decisions
(Certo et al., 2016; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). This is difficult for many reasons. First,
is the issue of non-random assignment to “treatment” or sample selection bias. At the end
of Phase III clinical trials, a firm forms the final assessment of its product based on its
expectations about the FDA regulators. A firm that does not believe their product will be
approved does not submit an application to the FDA. However, for those who do submit an
application to the FDA and receive a rejection, it is unclear what their beliefs were when
they chose to solicit FDA feedback. This makes the demand of feedback endogenous. Filing
an application is very cheap when compared to the costs of development20 and firms may
have different quality threshold requirements before filing.21 One example of a situation
that would lead to endogeneity in the model is if there was reverse causality or simulteneity.
Imagine a firm with one product in Phase III and a second in Phase II. The firm must decide
whether or not to submit an NDA for the first project but the firm believes rejection is likely.
Imagine also that the firm believes the second project is of low quality. It is straightforward
to conjure up a scenario in which the firm is more likely to submit an NDA for their first
project if it believes the second project is also a dud. This would result in a firm appearing
to become more risk averse following rejection, though it would not be caused by rejection.
20One may wonder why all firms do not submit an application even if they believe their chance of approval
is low. Based on my interviews with managers at several pharmaceutical firms, this can be attributed to
the fact that these interactions with the FDA are not one-shot games. Nor are they anonymous. Managers
therefore are not inclined to “clog up” the FDA with applications for drugs that they believe will have slim
chance of approval.
21For a game theoretic model demonstrating this these trade-offs, see Carpenter and Ting (2007).
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To adequately identify firm responses to FDA rejection, I modify a strategy undertaken by
Blankshain et al. (2013). They propose that the trick to eliminating the endogeneity between
regulatory decisions and firm decisions is to “focus on firm reactions to unanticipated changes
in regulation, or to ’surprise’ regulatory decisions” (pg. 3).22 Their strategy is to look at
changes in asset prices following negative regulatory decisions, under the assumption that
larger relative drops signaled more surprising decisions. Under the assumption that market
prices reflect full information, one would assume no abnormal return following a rejection if
it was not truly surprising. This is because the knowledge that the product would not be
approved would be already baked into the price prior to the announcement.
Despite a substantial history of looking at cumulative abnormal returns in the strategy
and economics literature, this method has many limitations in the context of this setting.
First, a number of firms in my data are private companies, or were when they received
an FDA rejection. And secondly, the probability of seeing a statistically significant asset
price dropped will be correlated with the value of the product that was under development.
A rejection of a potential blockbuster product would then likely result in a larger price
drop compared to an application for an indication extension even if the latter rejection
was more “surprising” to managers than the former. For example, consider the case of
the CRL issued for Amgen’s Xgeva in treatement for castration-resistant prostate cancer.
According to Amgen, the FDA suggested the reason for non-approval was that the provided
data didn’t show that the drug’s benefits were great enough to outweigh the risks in the
intended population. However, following this announcement on April 27, 2012, there is no
22The role of surprise to facilitate causal inference between inputs and outputs is a common strategy in
other groups as well. See e.g., Atanasov and Black (2016) and Azoulay et al. (2010).
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statistically significant decrease in returns. This may be because Xgeva was already approved
for a related indication, which the firm was clear to stress in their announcement.
Finally, the way in which FDA rejections are timed and responded to makes it difficult
to even find cumulative abnormal returns following FDA rejection.23 At the receipt of the
first CRL, firms issue a press release, often while maintaining conviction that the drug
will be approved after meeting with the FDA. As described above, these statements often
obfuscate the true nature of the CRL. In many cases the firm will go back and conduct more
trials or collect more data, occassionally collecting several CRLs as they work to ameliorate
the concerns of the FDA. This process could take months to years before the firm finally
terminates the project. Any beliefs about the project’s probability of success has likely been
decreasing over time in these cases. It is therefore unlikely that a research would see a strong
negative stock response at the time of termination.
To combat the limitations mentioned, I propose the following strategy for identifying
plausible unanticipated regulatory decisions. The pharmaceutical industry relies on many
private Pharma Intelligence companies who gather data on projects under development and
regulatory decisions. Many of these companies also provide the service of industry analysts,
who make predictions given all available information about the drug’s probability of success.
These include predictions regarding the probability of approval once a firm submits an NDA.
I collect data on these predictions from the industry analysts at BioMedTracker. Following
conversations with these analysts, I learn that these predictions are composed of two pieces:
a disease group “baseline” score given historical success rates of other drugs in that disease
23In exploring this on the subset of public firms in this study, I find only a handful of statistically significant
instances of abnormal returns following receipt of the first CRL. In exploring the cases where the drop in
return is statistically significant, I find that these constitute nearly all cases where the receipt of the CRL
resulted in immediate termination (that is, the date of the CRL and the date of termination were the same).
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group and an “Analyst Opinion Subjective Score” that is updated following every piece
of new information (including all trial data) as it is released. A score above the average
baseline indicates that analysts believe the drug is likely to be approved. In evaluating
their prediction performance, BioMedTracker determined that 99% of their predictions were
correct in recent years.
As my identification strategy, I consider only those rejections for which analysts believed
were highly likely (probability above average for the therapeutic class) to be accepted. The
assumption underlying this strategy is that firms will always submit a New Drug Application
for review if there is reason to believe that their product had a very high (usually at least
over 90%) probability of approval. This allows me to treat the subsequent rejections as
exogenous, or unanticipated, shocks.
Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics of characteristics of the products that meet this
criteria. Over a quarter are “secondary indications”, which suggest that the product has
already been approved for, or extensively studied for, another indication.24 And those re-
jected products that were nonetheless approved in another country make up 28% of FDA
rejections. Counterintuitively, a large majority of these products were neither biologics (for
which approval has historically been more difficult to achieve) or the novel set of products
that achieve preliminary advantages (“Receiving Gov Subsidies”).
A list of all drugs treated as “surprise” rejections is presented in Table 2.3.
24The exploration of already approved drugs is often called “drug repurposing” and is an important
innovation strategy in the biopharmaceutical industry. To repurpose a drug often results in cheaper Phase
I and II clinical trials as the product has already been shown to be safe (Pushpakom et al., 2019).
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Rejected Projects
2000-2018
Proportion of Proportion
Characteristic of Rejected of Approved
Biologic 19.1% 17.4%
Receiving Gov Subsidies 31.1% 21.5%
Secondary Indications 25.7% 34.6%
Approved Outside USA 27.7% 48.4%
Public Company 90.0% 88.2%
Headquartered USA 46.6% 42.1%
This table presents descriptive statistics of the 43 FDA rejected
products that are treated as exogenous shocks in this research.
Table 2.3: Full List of Treated Rejections
2000-2018
Drug Name Company Therapeutic Class
Acapodene GTx Inc. Oncology
Arcalyst Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc. Immunology
Arixtra Mylan Inc. Cardiovascular
Arxxant Eli Lilly & Company Ophthalmology
Asunaprevir Bristol-Myers Squibb Company Infectious disease
Avodart GlaxoSmithKline Plc. Oncology
Buprenorphine Spray INSYS Therapeutics Inc. Neurology
Certriad AbbVie Inc. Cardiovascular
Ciltyri Sanofi Neurology
Erbitux Eli Lilly & Company Oncology
Exanta AstraZeneca PLC Hematology
Fentora Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Neurology
Genasense Genta Inc. Oncology
Ilaris Novartis AG Immunology
Indiplon IR Neurocrine Biosciences Inc. Neurology
Indiplon XR Neurocrine Biosciences Inc. Neurology
Kengreal Chiesi Farmaceutici S.p.A. Cardiovascular
Lyrica CR Pfizer Inc. Neurology
Continued on next page
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Table 2.3 – continued from previous page
Drug Name Company Therapeutic Class
MoxDuo IR QRxPharma Limited Neurology
Naproxcinod Fera Pharmaceuticals Rheumatology
Natpara Shire Pharmaceuticals Group PLC Endocrine
Numax AstraZeneca PLC Infectious disease
Provigil Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Psychiatry
Reasanz Novartis AG Cardiovascular
Rekinla Jazz Pharmaceuticals plc Neurology
Remoxy Pain Therapeutics Inc. Neurology
Restanza Advanced Life Sciences Holdings Inc. Infectious disease
Rocilentinib Clovis Oncology Inc. Oncology
Samsca Otsuka Holdings Co. Cardiovascular
Satraplatin Agennix AG Oncology
Sirukumab Johnson & Johnson Immunology
Solithera Melinta Therapeutics Inc. Infectious disease
Taltorvic Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd Oncology
Thelin Pfizer Inc. Cardiovascular
Tipifarnib Kura Oncology Inc. Oncology
Velcade Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd Oncology
Visamerin Sanofi Hematology
Xarelto Johnson & Johnson Cardiovascular
Xeljanz Pfizer Inc. Immunology
Yondelis Johnson & Johnson Oncology
Zalbin GlaxoSmithKline plc Infectious disease
Zemdri Achaogen Inc. Infectious disease
Zimulti Sanofi Metabolic
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 Effect of Rejection on Future Investment
To explore the effects of negative feedback on future investment, I first consider how negative
feedback affects likelihood of investment in the project immediately following termination
(provided it is not the same molecule or pursuing the same biological target). To do this, I
estimate Equation 2.1 using a linear probability model with fixed effects. All specifications
use robust standard errors clustered at the Firm-Therapeutic Class level. In robustness
checks, I find that all specifications in this paper are robust to logit specifications.25 However,
for ease of interpretation, I will only formally report results from the linear probability
models. The results, presented in Table 2.4, suggest that firms become much less likely
to invest in the very next project following rejection. Because the dependent variable is
binary, we can interpret the coefficients as the change in the probability of investment,
controlling for drug and indication characteristics. The coefficient on the relevant variable,
Post-rejection is negative and significant at at least the ≤ 5% significance level under cluster-
robust standard errors in all three specifications. The preferred specification, number 3,
suggests that immediately following a failure, the firm will be 30 percentage points less
likely to take their next project to Phase III, when controlling for project characteristics.
In addition to the hypothesized effects on the coefficient of interest, the coefficients on the
control variables are all as expected. The coefficients on ODA, Fast-track, and Breakthrough
status (all government programs that reward novel innovations) are all strongly positive
25I also drop the project that was rejected from the data before running the regression. Including the
rejected project would bias the estimate toward seeing an effect post-rejection.
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and statistically significant. The measure for the possibility of spillovers (Lead Ind * Num
Inds) suggests products with a higher possibility of knowledge spillovers are also much more
likely to continue to Phase III clinical trials. The coefficient on number of competitors is
negative and significant when not using indication fixed effects and drugs within therapeutic
classes with higher approval probabilities are much more likely to continue as well. The
variable measuring the amount of experience a company has in conducting clinical trials, Past
Experience, is not statistically significant. Additionally, I do not find that firm capabilities
(as defined in several different ways) significantly affect a firm’s response to failure. See
Appendix A.4 for this analysis.
To initially estimate Equation 2.1, I had only considered the probability of continuation
for the first project immediately following rejection. As an additional possibility, I consider
the psychology literature on failure, which indicates that the negative emotions from project
failure, while felt strongly initially, will dissipate over time (Shepherd et al., 2011). This
phenomenon can also be explained by the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman,
1973). For example, in the model of investment decisions proposed by Jehiel (2018), he
finds using data from the mutual fund industry that firm behavior only changes when failure
is salient, but returns to being more risk-seeking as that rejection gets further away in
the manager’s memory. Similarly, Haunschild et al. (2015) find that pharmaceutical firms
adapt most from errors in drug safety right after they happen, but are likely to return to
past processes as time passes. Therefore, I want to explore if the failure effect displays
persistence over time. To analyze this further, I consider the effect of rejection on the next
two through eight projects that reach an end-of-Phase II decision node. Results for the linear
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Table 2.4: Probability of Investing in Phase III Trials Following FDA Rejection
2000-2018
Dependent Variable: Investment in Phase III
(1) (2) (3)
Next Project Following Rejection
Post-Rejection -0.188∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
ODA 0.234∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Breakthrough 0.384∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Fasttrack 0.235∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Lead Ind*Num Inds 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Num Competitors -0.000413∗∗ -0.000789 -0.000806
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Past Experience 0.000173 0.000168 0.000192
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.592∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 1.098∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.19) (0.26)
Indication FE N Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Molecule Type FE Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE Y Y Y
Company*Therapeutic Class FE N N Y
Observations 5938 5938 5938
R2 0.272 0.397 0.662
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product began Phase III clinical trials. Post-
rejection is an indicator equal to 1 if it was the next product to finish Phase II following
the receipt of a CRL and is not the same molecule as the failed product. Robust standard
errors in parentheses and clustered at Company*Therapeutic Class level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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probability model are presented in Table 2.5. The coefficients are slightly attenuated from
those in Table 2.4, suggesting a decline in the effects of failure over the next few projects.
However, they remain negative and statistically significant at the ≤ 10% significance level
under cluster-robust standard errors.
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One potential concern is that I am picking up a change in the timing of terminations,
rather than a decrease in the propensity to invest. For an in-depth analysis suggesting that
this is not the case, see Appendix A.5.
2.6.2 Quality of Investments Immediately Following Rejection
So far, I have demonstrated that when firms experience a large, externally-driven failure,
they become more conservative in their assessments of the quality of subsequent projects and
this persists for the next several projects considered. These results imply that the projects a
firm takes to Phase III trials following rejection should be of higher quality (e.g. more likely
to be approved) than the product it took to Phase III just before the rejected product.26 If
this was not the case, it would imply that the investment effect could be driven by something
other than an effect on the firm’s decision on the marginal product. To test this hypothesis,
I subset the sample to only those drugs that continued to Phase III trials.
Equation 2.2 gives the regression specification. Using a fixed effects regression with
controls for product characteristics and time, I test the hypothesis that projects proceeding
to Phase III after the firm experienced a failure are more likely to receive FDA approval
than those projects in Phase III trials before the CRL. Here, Post-rejection is an indicator
equal to 1 if the product is within the next set of projects to continue to Phase III following
rejection. As in the previous regressions, I do not include the project if it uses the same
molecule as the failed product to exclude any obvious molecule-specific information spillovers.
26There is anecdotal evidence about a “raising the bar” effect as well. A year after the rejection of
Glaxosmithkline’s Avodart, the firm hired a new president of R&D and focused on implementing a “discovery
investment board” that would make funding decisions for research projects. The blogger notes that “the
company is spending less on R&D and has raised the bar for moving a drug candidate into late-stage
development.” (Jarvis, 2012)
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The dependent variable Approved is an indicator equal to 1 if the molecule i received FDA
approval for treating indication j.
Pr(Approved|Phase III)ijrt = α0 + βPost-rejectionijrt + ΘXijt + δr + µt + ijrt (2.2)
Results are presented in Table 2.6. Columns 1 and 2 provide strong support for the
hypothesis that firms are taking higher quality products to Phase III following the CRL.
The estimates suggest that, controlling for product and firm characteristics, the next two
projects continuing to Phase III following rejection are 22% more likely to be approved.
However, as was suggested in Table 2.5, the effects of rejection appear to attenuate over
time. When observing the set of the next four products to receive investment following
rejection, the coefficients are smaller and lose statistical significance.
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Because it takes many years for a product to transition from Phase III clinical trials to
FDA approval this subset of data may suffer from a censoring problem. Consider an FDA
rejection for Product A in June of 2015. Then consider a product B, that the same firm
begins Phase III trials for in July 2015. In order for this product to be included in the
regression, it would have to have either achieved FDA approval or been terminated by 2018
(when the data was collected). I argue that if anything, this censoring problem leads to
a more conservative estimate of the effect presented in Table 2.6. Because it takes longer
to achieve FDA approval after beginning Phase III than to terminate following Phase III,
the data is likely picking up more Phase III terminations in the later portion of the sample
period, therefore biasing the estimates downward.
To confirm this intuition, I subset the data to span only those products entering Phase
III before 2013 and rerun the regression in Equation 2.2. Table 2.7 present the results. As
intuited, the results in Table 2.6 were significantly more conservative due to censoring. The
results in Table 2.7 suggest that following FDA rejection, the next two products to receive
Phase III investments were nearly 50% more likely than the firm’s baseline to receive FDA
approval.
2.6.3 The Role of Rejection on Investment in Novel Innovation
In this section, I explore the types of products that are terminated early following FDA rejec-
tion. In particular, I consider how rejection affects investment into products that have already
received regulatory attention. As described in the variable descriptions above, products that
are targeting an unmet therapeutic need are eligible for receiving special designations from
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Table 2.7: Probability of Approval Following Phase III Trials
2000 - 2012
Dependent Variable: FDA Approval
(1) (2) (3)
Next Project Next 2 Projects Next 3 Projects
Post-rejection 0.515∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.257∗
(0.15) (0.16) (0.15)
Project-time Controls Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Molecule Type FE Y Y Y
DrugClass FE Y Y Y
Company*Therapeutic Class FE Y Y Y
Observations 1433 1433 1433
R2 0.802 0.802 0.802
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product was approved by the FDA and 0 if it was
terminated during or after Phase III clinical trials. Post-rejection is an indicator equal to
1 if it was one of the following products to enter Phase III (within the specified timeframe)
following the receipt of a CRL for a different molecule. Robust standard errors in parentheses
and clustered at Company*Therapeutic Class level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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the FDA. In these data, I identify those that have received Orphan Drug, Breakthrough, or
Fasttrack designations. These statuses allow the firm certain privileges, such as faster review
times, smaller Phase III clinical trials, and even additional market exclusivity if approved.
To receive these benefits from the FDA, a firm must submit additional documentation either
with the Investigational New Drug application or at some point during development. The
FDA then considers the preliminary evidence that the drug is likely to be safe and efficacious
in the specified disease, and grants the firm one of these coveted designations.
As seen in Tables 2.5 - 2.7, firms are more likely to take products that have received
these designations to Phase III and, at least for products designated as either breakthrough
or orphan drugs, are more likely to be approved. Unsurprisingly then, the receipt of one of
these special statuses also serves as a signal of product quality. Studies have shown that
investors are more likely to fund projects with either Fasttrack, Breakthrough or Orphan
drug designations (Kim et al., 2018; Meekings et al., 2012). Given the above, one may
hypothesize that even if firms are less likely to continue investing in certain products following
FDA rejection, these government subsidized products would not be in that subset. To test
this formally, I reproduce the regression from Tables 2.4 and 2.5 but with an additional
interaction between the indicator for Post-rejection and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
follow product was obtained either Fasttrack, Orphan Drug, or Breakthrough designations.
Results are presented in Table 2.8.
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Surprisingly, these results suggest the opposite of my initial conjecture is more likely to
be true. Not only are those government subsidized products less likely to receive Phase III
investments following FDA rejection, but they appear to encompass a substantial part of the
negative effect. This result provides a more nuanced view of what exactly the firm’s managers
are “learning” following surprising FDA rejections. Despite the favorable incentives given to
firms to develop novel drugs for unmet needs, there is likely more uncertainty surrounding
their development and probability of getting approved. In fact, surprising FDA rejections of
this class of products account for 25% of the surprising rejections, which is greater than the
proportion of these products in phase II clinical trials (20%). Table 2.8 suggests that not
only are firms more likely to adapt their future investment strategy to discontinue marginally
lower quality drugs, but are also less likely to continue investing in more novel drugs for which
approval is less certain.
An additional possibility that is supported by these findings is that the managers of
these firms lose confidence in the regulators. One of the main incentives of programs like
Breakthrough designations or Fasttrack status is that the firm has more opportunities to
work with the FDA during clinical development to construct a plan on how to achieve
regulatory approval. Following surprising rejections, this incentive may be less appealing
to a manager, who already likely feels that they were treated unfairly by the FDA. For
example, consider the response by Doug Ingram, CEO of Sarepta in response to a CRL for
their drug golodirsen: “We are very surprised to have received the complete response letter
this afternoon. Over the entire course of its review, the Agency did not raise any issues
suggesting the non-approvability of golodirsen, including the issues that formed the basis of
the complete response letter” (Sarepta press release, August 19, 2019).
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2.7 Mechanism Exploration
2.7.1 Comparing Rejection to Phase III Failures
This paper demonstrates that when firms experience a large externally-driven failure after
investing in an innovation project they become more conservative in their investment deci-
sions immediately following FDA rejection and this often leads to investing in better quality
products following this event. This can be visualized as a firm increasing the quality thresh-
old that they require to continue investing in the development of a product. While I attribute
this to being due to the firm’s leadership re-calibrating its decision-making criteria, one could
still argue that this may be due to an information effect. Particularly for firms working on
one class of drug or one therapeutic area, experiencing a negative feedback may cause them
to re-evaluate other drugs in the same therapeutic class, or with the same target or mecha-
nism of action. While I control for this by including a variable measuring the probability of
spillovers and excluding cases where it is the same molecule being developed for a different
indication, one could argue that this may be insufficient. Krieger (2018) shows that firms
do terminate clinical trials based on negative information (as gleaned from a competitor’s
termination decisions) about similar drugs. If firms have multiple similar products in their
pipeline, then any information gleaned about one product could spill over to others.
If the information hypothesis was correct (or explained the majority of the effect) then
one should see changing investment decisions following not just rejections by the FDA, but
failures that occur late into Phase III clinical trials as well. A firm terminating a project at
the end of Phase III (and therefore deciding to not pursue an NDA or BLA) invests nearly the
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same amount of resources as a firm that received an FDA rejection. Recent studies show that
these Phase III abandonments can also be distressing for the firm financially (Hermosilla,
2020). However, the main difference between these two types of failure is the source of the
information. A firm terminating its Phase III trial has learned of its product’s deficiencies
internally, while a firm that receives an FDA rejection is informed of their errors from an
external judge. As explored by Haunschild and Rhee (2004) and Mody (1993), knowledge
gleaned from external arbiters can lead to different types of knowledge generated within the
firm and therefore may lead to a difference in future risk preferences. A firm that views its
Phase III data and determines that they will not have a successful NDA application will
have a different internal narrative of the failure, despite consuming nearly as many resources
(and receiving the same information about their product) as those receiving a CRL.
To explore how internally determined product failures can affect an organization’s future
decision making, I construct a dataset of Phase III trials for which the duration is in the top
75% of Phase III trials for that therapeutic class, but that were voluntarily terminated by the
firm. I assume that Phase III trials in the upper end of this distribution use approximately
the same amount of resources as a project failing at the NDA stage.27 However, these
situations differ in one key way: here the firm was able to ascertain that its product was
not of high enough quality following its review of the data and therefore terminated the
project on its own accord. In essence, these failures differ in that they did not experience
negative feedback from an outside critic. I then estimate Equation 2.3, which is analogous to
Equation 2.1, but with the relevant coefficient being the one on post-Phase III termination.
As in Equation 2.1, X is a vector of Project-time controls, and δr and µt represent fixed
27In robustness checks, I find these results are robust to a variety of cutoffs.
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effects for firm-therapeutic department and year respectively.
Pr(Phase III|Phase II)ijrt = α0 + βPost-terminationijrt + ΘXijt + δr + µt + ijrt (2.3)
Estimates for the coefficients in Equation 2.3 are provided in Table 2.9. The very small
and insignificant coefficients on the relevant variable, Post-termination suggest that the
effects shown in the previous regressions are likely not the result of only learning new in-
formation about a technology. These results suggest that following a voluntary late-stage
Phase III termination, firms do not appear to become more risk averse, and therefore the
following projects they bring are no more likely to be approved than they would without
the large failure. Note that these results cannot be interpreted causally but rather signify
an association. In addition, these results also lend more evidence contrary to the potential
hypothesis that the effect is driven by financial constraints. Phase III trials can cost upwards
of $80 million and easily make up the largest costs involved in drug development. If financial
constraints were the ultimate driver of the observed behavior change, then one would expect
see a similar effect on Post-termination in Table 2.9 to the one on Post-Rejection in Table
2.4. On the contrary, all coefficients on the relevant variables in Table 2.9 are close to zero
and statistically insignificant.
In addition, these results provide interesting insight into the role that the messaging of the
feedback plays on a firm’s future actions. While literature on feedback has often considered
all types of negative feedback to be similar for organizational adaptation, (e.g. whether it is
generated from an experiment failure in R&D or customer feedback) this analysis suggests
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Table 2.9: The Probability of a Product in Phase II Trials Continuing to
Phase III
Following Voluntary Phase III Termination
Dependent Variable: Investment in Phase III
(1) (2) (3)
Next Project Following Rejection
Post-termination 0.0229 0.0153 -0.0130
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
ODA 0.249∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Breakthrough 0.379∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Fasttrack 0.234∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lead Ind*Num Inds 0.0218∗∗∗ 0.0239∗∗∗ 0.0224∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Num Competitors -0.000517∗∗∗ -0.000603 -0.000436
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Past Experience 0.000107∗∗ 0.000138∗∗∗ 0.000135
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 0.475∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 1.049∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.18) (0.26)
Indication FE N Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Molecule Type FE Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE Y Y Y
Company*Therapeutic Class FE N N Y
Observations 6353 6353 6353
R2 0.281 0.402 0.560
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product began Phase III clinical trials.
Post-termination is an indicator equal to 1 if it was the next product to com-
plete Phase II clinical trials following the voluntary late termination of a Phase III
trial. I define a late termination as one that lasted longer than the average for
its therapeutic class. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
Company*Therapeutic Class level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
56
that is not the case. The main difference between the feedback a firm experienced in this
section and in the prior sections is that in the latter, the decision to terminate was internally
decided. In the previous investigations, the termination decision was made by an external
regulating body. One interpretation of these most recent findings is that firms are more
sensitive to negative feedback when they become external, or public affairs. Because receiving
a CRL implies the firm did not interpret its own data correctly, this could be a bigger catlayst
for the firm to change its subsequent decision-making criteria.
Additionally, I find that these results hold when looking at only those Phase III termina-
tions that lead to a significantly negative cumulative abnormal return following announcment
of the trial’s termination. This is one way to subset the trials into only those Phase III fail-
ures that were truly surprising (as suggested by Blankshain et al., 2013). While this method
doesn’t come with all of the limitations as it would in the case of CRLs, namely the issue
of ascertaining the true timing of the failure, it does require me to restrict the data to only
those companies that were public at the time of termination. However, this method demon-
strates that these “non-results” hold under a few different methodological approaches. See
Appendix A.6 for more information.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I have demonstrated empirically that firms react to unanticipated negative
outcomes in their decisions regarding mid-stage innovation projects. Using the setting of
the pharmaceutical industry, I examine a decision node in which a firm’s managers will
have substantial but incomplete information about the product under development. To
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empirically test the effect that FDA rejections play on managerial beliefs, I run several
models estimating the effect these failures have on investments in future R&D projects, while
controlling for many characteristics of the subsequent projects. I find that following these
rejections, firms become more conservative investors in future projects under development,
that this effect persists for at least several subsequent projects, and that this leads to better
outcomes (where “better” here refers to the proportion of successful Phase III investments)
for the firm when they do choose to invest further. The evidence suggests these firms are
discontinuing their marginally riskier products following failure.
These conclusions will be of interest to both policy makers and those who have personal
and financial interests in the commercialization of new drugs. From a policy standpoint, the
main conclusion suggested in this paper is that negative regulatory feedback can influence
firms to invest fewer dollars in projects that are less likely to succeed. However, this may come
at a cost to society if firms are eschewing the more novel products that could substantially
raise welfare and promote further innovation. Understanding the aggregate effects of this
trade-off is an important topic for future research.
In addition, managers at pharmaceutical firms can benefit from internalizing these re-
sults. Understanding how one’s competitors are likely to behave is a crucial component
of competitive strategy. And there is both anecdotal and statistically consistent evidence
that pharmaceutical firms closely watch and anticipate their competitors’ innovation devel-
opments in making decisions about their own strategies. Given this, these findings have the
ability to aid managers in further developing their competitive strategic responses.
And finally, these findings are important for furthering the strategy literature on orga-
nizational learning and resource allocation. If we are to think of a firm as a collection of
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resources and capabilities that are dependent on past investments in their development, this
paper speaks to ways in which that path dependency may be suddenly altered (Nelson and
Winter, 1982). This in turn, could have implications on the types of resources and capa-
bilities developed and have implications for firm performance that stretch beyond the short
term.
2.8.1 Limitations and Further Research
While the analyses provided here suggest that firms adapt their decision criteria following
certain types of negative feedback, there are several limitations to be addressed. One lim-
itation concerns the selection effect into the treatment. While I limit the treatment to be
those cases where a firm submitted an NDA or BLA and outside experts strongly believed
it would be approved, one could still argue that the type of projects that are rejected are
fundamentally different from those that are approved. In robustness tests not displayed
formally here, I find the stated results attenuate when including those rejections that were
deemed potentially non-surprising by industry analysts. This does provide further evidence
that it is the element of surprise, or learning that the firm’s beliefs did not coincide with
the FDAs, that leads to this change in firm behavior. However, additional research in other
industries could further bolster these findings. While I demonstrate that firms may adapt
their risk-taking preferences following the information received from FDA rejections, more
research on the precise mechanism is needed. Additionally, due to data constraints in this
industry, I am only able to observe the effect of rejection on changing investment strategies
for later stage clinical trials. Exploring the effect of negative feedback on early stage R&D
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would provide additional nuance to this story.
This paper has focused on the biopharmaceutical industry. Empirical research in other
industries would be a useful addition to the exploration of this effect. While CRLs are
unique to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, there are many other industries
that require regulatory approval to market a product and for which it is important for firms
to terminate bad investments early. This valuable capability requires making sound intra-
firm judgments about an innovation project. Understanding if this could be “learned” from
rejection could continue to enhance theories of organizational learning.
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Chapter 3 Demand Shocks, Decentralization, and
Resource Allocation in Innovation
3.1 Introduction
How do firms adapt to demand-side shocks and why do we observe differences in these
adaptations? External shocks that shift demand, be it from policy changes, natural disasters,
or sudden changes in purchasing priorities, present complex challenges to firms, as they must
successfully adapt to maintain a competitive advantage. This is a question important to
strategy scholars as it pertains to the strength of dynamic capabilities within a firm (Helfat
et al., 2009).
There is a rich literature exploring how firms respond to both technological shocks and
negative external shocks like recessions. For example, in studying growth reconfiguration
among firms, Chakrabarti (2015) finds that growing firms are more likely to fail during a
negative economic shock than firms that responded to the shock by down-scaling. However,
despite the prevalence and importance of positive demand-side shocks, there has been limited
exploration of the different choices firms make in their responses. One noted exception is
Wang et al. (2020) who explore how firms adapt to increased demand for defense technologies
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following the attacks of September 11, 2001. They examine the effects of firm capabilities on
the direction of adaptation following a sudden increase in demand and find that pre-existing
customer relationships and the relevance of the firm’s technological capabilities play a role
in how firms adapt to the reshuffling of demand preferences.
There is substantial evidence in the economics and management literature that market
demand is positively correlated with the number of products developed for that market
(Griliches and Schmookler, 1963; Schmookler, 1966; Schumpeter, 1942). This suggests that
positive demand shocks should lead to the reshuffling of innovation priorities within the
economy as a whole. Much of the empirical work exploring this theory has used data from
the pharmaceutical industry, where innovation is both crucial for firm success while being
relatively easy to measure due to the regulated nature of drug development. For example,
Acemoglu and Linn (2004) show that an expected increase in a certain demographic leads
to an increase in pharmaceuticals that are marketed for that demographic. In a similar vein,
Dubois et al. (2015) estimate the elasticity of innovation for pharmaceuticals. They find
that a 10% increase in the market size for a drug results in a 2.5% increase in the number
of products for that market receiving approval from the US Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”).
However, while exploring the effects of market size on the number of products available
is important for consumer utility, it largely obscures the role that firms play in bringing
the product to market. Because firms (rather than government agencies) are primarily
responsible for developing and marketing new drugs, the aggregate change in new drugs
available will be largely determined by how individual firms allocate resources. Innovation,
especially in the life sciences, is often a risky and expensive endeavor. In industries where
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product development takes many years, it requires managers to form expectations about the
state of the world many years in the future. And for firms that make many products for
different markets, changes in the expected demand of downstream consumers will lead to
increased trade-offs within an innovation pipeline.
Missing from these discussions is the way in which firm boundaries may influence how
firms adapt to a changing external environment, a topic that is prominent in strategic man-
agement. I argue that the boundaries of firms, and therefore the structure of their internal
capital market, provide an important and still unexplored determinant of innovative activi-
ties following external shocks. The logic is as follows: in the drug development process, where
costs of clinical trials increase exponentially as the product moves through development, re-
sources become particularly constrained in the later stages of development. Therefore, as
a product moves through clinical trials, firms must evaluate whether to continue investing
in one product in favor of another at a similar level of development. Factors that influence
this decision will include the likelihood of approval by the FDA (as is required for a product
to be marketed in the United States) and the expected revenue each drug could generate
(conditional on FDA approval). A sudden positive change in demand that affects one class of
drug over another would therefore change the calculation a firm makes in choosing in which
drug it will continue investing.
The pharmaceutical industry is especially relevant for this study due to ongoing concerns
regarding efficiency and quality in R&D (see e.g., Ruffolo, 2006; Scannell et al., 2012). The
costs of creating one FDA-approved drug have been increasing over the course of the decade
and are now expected to average $2.6 billion (DiMasi et al., 2010, 2016). Because these
costs are largely driven by the cost of failed innovations, understanding what drives firms to
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continue investing in products that will eventually fail may have broad efficiency gains for the
industry as a whole. This decrease in efficiency can be seen in the data. In the early aughts,
firms took an average of 0.34 products per year to Phase III clinical trials (the final most
expensive stage of development before FDA approval) and averaged 0.17 approvals per year.
By the end of the decade, firms were conducting an average 0.5 Phase III clinical trials per
year while only averaging 0.21 approvals. This suggests firms are investing more in expansive
and expensive development phases while not seeing the same increase in revenue-generating
outcomes.
This study will contribute to the literature on firm adaptation in the face of reshuffling
of consumer demand. First, I explore how demand shocks affect resource allocation in the
aggregate. Firms can adapt to demand-side changes via two channels: they can develop
completely new products that are aligned with these changing consumer preferences, or
they can adapt their existing routines to favor those technologies positively affected by the
demand shock. This study will look exclusively at the second phenomenon. Using pipeline
data from the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry, I provide evidence that following
a sudden change in expectations about future demand, firms make several adaptations to
their investment protocols for product development. First, I identify the 2003 Medicare
Modernization Act as a policy that changed expectations about future demand for a certain
subset of pharmaceutical drugs. The expectation that Medicare Part D would increase
pharmaceutical spending for certain types of drugs treating certain types of diseases is the
exogenous shock that facilitates my identification strategy. Then, using a triple-difference
regression, I show that the average firm response following this positive demand shock was to
change its investment criteria for development projects at the most resource intensive stages
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of product development. I am able to show that this change in criteria lead to a decrease in
the proportion of developed products being approved, as firms find it more beneficial to take
bigger risks following an increase in expected revenues. Finally, I demonstrate that even
those products receiving FDA approval following the policy change spent longer in FDA
review. This suggests that even those approved products did not pass smoothly through the
regulatory process and could imply that they received less favorable indication (or disease)
designations.
Secondly, I consider how heterogeneity among firms may lead to deviations in this aver-
age affect. Both the capital budgeting and product diversification literature suggests that
the more diversified (and in this case, the more decentralized) a firm becomes, the more
distortions one will see in resource allocation at the firm level. To explore my above findings
in this context, I explore if large, diversified and decentralized “big pharma” firms respond
differently than their smaller counterparts. After dividing the sample into these groups,
I find that it is these smaller, more centralized firms that are driving the average result.
Larger, decentralized pharmaceutical firms do not appear to respond to the policy shock.
This study is novel for a few reasons. While several past papers explore how industries re-
act to changes in expected customer demand, this is one of the few to demonstrate how these
changes impact managerial decisions at the intensive margin. In addition, this study explores
and quantifies potential downsides of policies that suddenly shift demand expectations–
specifically that they incentivize investment away from marginally more promising products,
to marginally less promising products. Furthermore, this study adds to the literature on
organizational structure and resource allocation, and brings empirical data to Stein’s theo-
retical arguments of the headquarter’s role in “winner picking” and “loser sticking” (Stein,
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1997, 2002).
Finally, this study provides important insights regarding the pharmaceutical industry’s
ability to respond quickly to demand shocks. During the coronavirus outbreak of 2020, the
industry faced criticism for moving too slowly to begin developing vaccines to fight the virus
(Posner, 2020). This study demonstrates that, with the right incentives, certain types of
firms respond fairly quickly to changing incentives to develop drugs. Furthermore, while
there are likely many factors underlying the decrease in R&D efficiency in this industry
(changing approval standards, the increased cost of technology, the exhaustion of the “low
hanging fruit”) one plausible hypothesis is that as firms predict increased market sizes (from
aging demographics, expanded insurance access, or otherwise) it may be more profitable in
expectation for firms to continue investing in projects that, but for these expected increases
in demand, they would have terminated earlier. This study will address that hypothesis
by not only exploring if firms invested more in a certain project’s developments following
a sudden change in market size, but will also explore if that lead to lower overall approval
rates for those projects. Understanding these incentives may be the key in the face of future
health threats.
3.2 Industry Setting and Hypothesis Generation
To explore how changes in expected market size may impact resource allocation decisions
in innovation, I first develop a framework for how these decisions are made in equilibrium.
Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies typically have many projects under develop-
ment at one time. Firm decisions on whether or not to proceed with or terminate a drug’s
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development plays an important role for influencing the type of projects that will eventually
reach market (Jekunen, 2014). The research and development of new molecules (which can
eventually become marketed drugs) is time consuming and expensive. Recent estimates put
the cost of bringing a drug from infancy to approval at $2.6 billion (DiMasi et al., 2003).
Additionally, drug development is a risky endeavor. Only 15% of products entering clinical
trials will ultimately be approved (DiMasi et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 2016).
The research and development of new molecules can broadly be divided into two parts:
discovery/research and product development. The second half of drug creation, the develop-
ment phase, is the longest and most expensive part of the innovation process and is the focus
of this study. It has been estimated to take an average of 6.5 years (Mestre-Ferrandiz et al.,
2016). Development is broken out into three phases: Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III. Phase
I is the shortest and consists of a firm testing its molecule on 20-100 healthy volunteers to
confirm the safety of the molecule. If that is found to be satisfactory, the product can move
to Phase II. Phase II is the first real study of the drug’s effectiveness on sick volunteers.
Phase III trials are often longer and more expensive versions of Phase II trials, sometimes
involving up to 3,000 patients. After having completed a Phase III trial, the firm will submit
a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to the Food and Drug Administration for review. Only
after a drug has been approved by the FDA can it be sold and marketed for that indication,
or disease, in the United States.
For this study, I specifically consider the decision to move a product (defined as both
the molecule and the indication it intends to treat) from Phase II to Phase III trials. The
transition from Phase II to Phase III makes a particularly good setting to study a firm’s risk
preferences under incomplete information. Despite being the final step in drug development,
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Phase III trials are still very risky. Recent evidence suggests the probability of transitioning
from Phase III to submitting an NDA application is between 57-71% from 2000-2015 and
can be as low as 34% for certain therapeutic categories (Wong et al., 2018). Additionally,
Phase III trials are the most expensive part of the drug development process, costing a firm
between $12 to $53 million dollars (Sertkaya et al., 2016). This is more than three times the
cost of Phase II clinical trials (Lam, 2004).
To understand the effect of a market size shock on decision making within a firm, I first
propose a model of how a firm’s managers decide to take a molecule to Phase III clinical trials
and then determine if an increase in market size results in a change in decision criteria. It has
some similarities to the one developed by Arora et al. (2009) in that a decision to continue is
a function of not only managerial subjective judgment of the likelihood of approval, but the
assessment of factors like expected demand. To begin, I assume that researchers within a
firm follow a multi-step Bayesian process of gaining and integrating signals about the quality
(and therefore the potential revenues) of a product. These revenues will only be realized if
the product is approved by the FDA, and therefore achieves “successful” Phase III trials.
Importantly, “success” in a clinical trial is interpreted by the firm. It is only after submitting
an NDA with the FDA that a firm can get an objective measure of the quality of their drug.
Products will only continue to the next phase if the researchers receive a positive signal from
the previous phase.
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3.2.1 Aggregate Responses to Demand-Side Shocks
In this section, I will describe the decision-making process within a firm as gleaned from
my interviews with industry professionals, including those within both small biotechnology
firms and their more traditional “big pharma” counterparts. The decision to terminate a
project at Phase II (that is, not continue to Phase III) is almost always made by the firm’s
upper management following input from the project’s lead scientist. In smaller firms, these
roles can be one and the same. Because the safety of the molecule is usually established by
Phase II, many projects are terminated in these later stages for efficacy-related or economic
concerns (Pak et al., 2015). In the empirical setting, I will simplify this interplay by referring
to “the firm” as the decision maker, as is standard in the industrial organization literature.
After completing Phase II trials for a product at time t, a firm r updates its belief
about the quality of molecule i for treating indication j such that Pijrt = P (). Without
loss of generality, I normalize Pijrt to be between 0 and 1 and reinterpret it as a probability
that this molecule i will be approved by the FDA for indication j after Phase III trials.
While this is a subjective measure, I can assume that it is a function of molecule and
indication characteristics such as the formulation of the drug, the mechanism of action
and the indication. I assume that all firms incorporate knowledge of historic transition
probabilities in their assessments of their projects.
If Pijrt is judged to be greater than some value E[Kj(T )|t], the firm proceeds to Phase III.
E[Kj(T )|t] is the firm’s expectation (at time t) of the potential revenue it can achieve at time
T , the time the molecule is approved for indication j (if it is approved). Here, E[Kj(T )|t]
can be interpreted as a threshold, and it is a function of the indication being pursued, the
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number of competing products treating that indication and the costs to develop the product.
The prevalence of the disease and the number of already approved drugs to treat that disease
approximate the expected revenue of the product in the empirical specification. Additionally,
I will assume that the costs of Phase III trials can be approximated by both the indication it
is intending to treat and whether or not it is included in a cost-saving government program
(such as receiving Breakthrough or Orphan Drug status). I assume that E[Kj(T )|t] is an
objective value shared by all firms working on the same indication j at time t. That is, every
firm has roughly the same expectation of the returns they could accrue by developing a drug
to treat a certain disease.
At time t, firm r faces a choice set D = {Continue, Terminate}. The firm chooses to
continue when the expected quality Pijrt is greater than the indication specific threshold
E[Kj(T )|t]. While I do not calculate E[Kj(T )|t] explicitly, I assume that it is between 0 and
1 and that it is decreasing in market size and increasing in the number of substitutes on the
market. After Phase II trials, a firm develops its prior Pijrt. Again, if Pijrt > E[Kj(T )|t],
the firm chooses D = Continue and moves on to Phase III trials. These Phase III trials are
where firms gather the data to present to the FDA for approval. A firm that gets a signal of
“Success” in Phase III will then submit a New Drug Application (NDA). A firm that gets a
signal of “Failure” will terminate their efforts.1
According to the framework presented above, drugs intended to treat larger markets, all
else equal, should be more likely to be taken to Phase III clinical trials. Explicitly, this
implies the increase in the prevalence of indication j should lead to a decrease in the firm’s
1Occasionally, a firm will misinterpret the signal received at the end of Phase III trials and submit an
NDA application to the FDA. This is very rare (around 2% of cases in my data).
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continuation threshold, as expressed formally in Equation 3.1.
δE[Kj(T )|t]
δj
< 0 (3.1)
Additionally, because an increase in j has no effect on Pijrt as constructed here, one
should expect more positive continuation decisions for pharmaceuticals targeting larger mar-
kets. That is, firms should be more willing to invest in these risky (and costly) Phase III
trials for a product with the ability to generate greater returns. From a resource allocation
perspective, this implies that when deciding how to allocate resources between two drugs
under development, a firm may choose to allocate their R&D resources to the product with
a lower likelihood of approval if that product has a high enough profit potential. In this
study I will not consider sudden changes in the prevalence of a disease but sudden changes
in the likelihood of people with that disease purchasing treatment. This will be explained
further in the next section.
Hypothesis 1: Following a demand-side shock leading to increased demand for a certain
subset of technologies, there will be an increase in the proportion of that class of
technologies continuing to Phase III clinical trials.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that, following a demand shock, there is an increased propensity
to invest in technologies that otherwise would have been terminated in the counterfactual.
This implies that but-for the shock, the firm would have determined the product to be less
desirable than others in its pipeline. This could be because either the risk was too high (a
low probability of approval) or the benefits (expected profit) were too low. If, following the
shock, the firm determines more products in this class to be desirable investments, it is due
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to the increase in expected profit. By assuming that the demand-side shock only changed
the expect profit to this class of products (rather than the probability of approval Pijrt) it
follows that products that are now receiving Phase III investment have a lower potential for
approval than those in the class that would have received investment in the but-for world.
This leads to Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: Following a demand-side shock leading to increased demand for a certain
subset of technologies, there will be a decrease in the proportion of those affected
technologies coming to market following Phase III investment.
3.2.2 Heterogeneity in Responses to Demand-Side Shocks
While Hypotheses 1 and 2 speak to the average adaptation one would expect to observe
following a demand-side shock, it is likely that firm characteristics will moderate the direc-
tion and severity of the adaptation. I hypothesize that the results presented above will be
moderated by a firm’s capabilities in effectively reallocating resources among its development
projects. By resources, I am considering everything from financial resources to human capi-
tal. Generally, strategic management scholars have found a positive relationship between a
firm’s ability to reallocate resources and its performance (see e.g., Teece, 2007 and Lovallo
et al., 2020).
One possibility is that some firms are less able to more efficiently allocate resources
following a policy change. For example, for firms with a fixed amount of resources dedicated
to each therapeutic class (and particularly if those divisions are in separate cities) it may
be less likely that firms can easily transfer resources between divisions quickly following a
72
change. For example, suppose that following a change in health policy, firms were incentivised
to invest more resources in their neurology group – the therapeutic class that contains
disease like Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, multiple sclerosis, and sciatica. If a firm already
has an active division of neurology that is already at capacity, the firm may not have the
resources (lab space, scientists, etc.) to direct more research here in the short run. This
could be especially true if the firm cannot easily transfer resources from another division
(say, oncology) to neurology. This may be the case if the divisions are distinctly separate
from each other. This could be true if, for example, the divisions are separate geographically
or have different but powerful key decision makers.
In this industry, there is strong evidence in the data that the product diversification
(having ongoing products within multiple therapeutic classes) within a company is strongly
correlated with decentralization (having labs in multiple states and/or countries). Figure
3.1 plots the relationship between these two. As illustrated, the vast majority of firms in the
sample (to be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3) specialize in developing drugs within
one therapeutic division.
An example of what I will refer to as a more decentralized company is Pfizer. Pfizer
has at least nine R&D locations spread across the United States and the United Kingdom.
While their corporate headquarters is located in New York City, their oncology unit is in
Pearl River, NY, their biotechnology unit is in La Jolla, CA, their vaccine unit is in Saint
Louis, MO, and their unit for Pain and Sensory disorders is located in Cambridge, UK. I
hypothesize that a decentralized company like Pfizer may be less likely to reallocate resources
from, say, St. Louis to Pearl River in the short run. Pfizer is hardly unique in their R&D
structure– many of the large pharmaceutical firms are decentralized. And this is uniquely
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.Figure 3.1: This heatmap demonstrates the positive correlation between number of product
divisions and number of locations within firms in the sample. Data from BioMedTracker and
Evaluate Pharma.
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distinct from smaller companies, which are largely located if not on one central campus, in
one city. As one would expect given evidence from Figure 3.1, Pfizer is also heavily diversified
in the types of therapies it develops.
While there has been some historical research on the role of organizational structure on
firm strategy (Friebel and Raith, 2010; Groves and Loeb, 1979; Harris and Raviv, 2002) and
the role of decentralization in resource allocation within countries (Marschak, 1968), few
papers have explored how organizational structure may impact resource allocation under
changing environments. One exception is Aghion et al. (2020), who explore how decentralized
vs. centralized companies fare following economic crises. They find that firms that were more
decentralized before the Great Recession out-performed their more centralized peers during
the crisis. However, they acknowledge that this is not initially intuitive. For example,
managers in more centralized firms may be better able to make tough decisions (such as
shuttering poorly performing divisions) in an economic crisis. They believe their results
are driven by the important role of knowledge of the local environment that guides a more
decentralized firm to weather a downturn.
The setting of this research is under very different conditions – one where firms realize the
existence of new profitable opportunities and therefore must decide how to properly reallocate
resources to capture them. As explored by Leiponen and Helfat (2011), the decision of where
to conduct R&D across a decentralized firm is an important strategic decision that may
have consequences for firm performance. And furthermore, the organizational economics
literature postulates that, due to economies of coordination and reduction of transaction
costs, centralized firms will have better innovation performance. In studying the effects of
organizational structure on the quality of R&D output, Argyres and Silverman (2004) find
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that centralized firms do better on this metric. In this study, I will explore the effects of
organizational structure on the propensity of firms to allocate resources following a demand
shock.
In properly formulating my hypotheses, I will turn to the literature on internal capital
allocation.2. Early work in organizational economics (notably Williamson, 1975) posits that
the role of corporate headquarters is to allocate scarce resources across its organizational
units. Work by Stein (1997, 2002) demonstrates that under capital constraints, firm bound-
aries play an important role in how resources are allocated within a firm. In particular,
he popularized the notion that headquarters are responsible for “winner picking” and “loser
sticking” among divisions. Depending on the opportunities within the firm, one division may
be resource constrained despite another being resource rich, and also despite the prevalence
of profitable opportunities within the “poor” division. In testing Stein’s theory, Gartenberg
(2014) finds that the orientation of a firm’s parent company leads to different types of loans
being issued during the lead up to the 2007 mortgage crisis and that this led to differential
performance of firms following the crash. The differences, she determines, were driven by
the presence of alternative uses (or lack thereof) of capital within the firm.
Following the work of Stein, scholars have continued to explore the conditions under which
corporate headquarters allocate resources efficiently. This has been referred to as the “dark
side” of internal capital markets (Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010). Using data on Compustat
firms across a broad array of industries, Shin and Stulz (1998) find that firms are not efficient
at moving resources to their most valuable opportunities. This finding that managers are
bad at “winner picking” under diversification has also been found in work by Liebeskind
2For an extensive review of the recent literature and empirical findings, see Busenbark et al. (2017)
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(2000), Rajan et al. (2000), Bernardo et al. (2006) and Ahn and Denis (2004). Given this, I
hypothesize that an increasingly decentralized firm may be less likely to reallocate resources
from one project to another in the short run. This would be demonstrated empirically as
seeing no change in the propensity to take an affected class of therapies from Phase II to
Phase III, despite the sudden change in expected returns on the therapy. This leads to
Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: Following a demand-side shock leading to increased demand for a certain
subset of technologies, there will be a greater increase in the proportion of that class of
technologies continuing to Phase III clinical trials for firms that are smaller or more
centralized than seen in larger, decentralized firms.
3.3 Empirical Setting and Data
As a demand shock, I will consider the passage of the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA)
in the United States in December of 2003.3 The relevant part of the bill for this research was
the creation of the program that today is known as Medicare Part D. This program lead to
an increase in Medicare costs by 10% in order to provide additional coverage to recipients.
Prior to the creation of Medicare Part D, those covered by Medicare were only covered for
pharmaceuticals used in a hospital setting. As a result, seniors spent considerably more
on their prescription drugs than their employed counterparts. In 2002, the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that Medicare recipients spent an average of $2,500 per person on
3There are several papers in the economics literature that use increases in coverage by Medicare as a
proxy for an increase in demand (see e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2006; Blume-Kohout and Sood, 2013; Dranove
et al., 2014; Finkelstein, 2004). The assumption in all of these cases is that when the consumer is not bearing
the full cost for a pharmaceutical, they will be more likely to purchase that product.
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prescription drugs. Medicare Part D sought to give both the disabled and those aged 65 and
older prescription drug benefits to offset some of these costs. While enrollment in Medicare
Part D is voluntary it became very popular among both Medicare recipients and private
insurance companies who had the opportunity to offer plans– by 2008 there were over 1,800
different Prescription Drug Plans offering coverage through Part D (Hoadley, 2008).
While the bill was passed in December 2003, Medicare Part D coverage did not formally
begin until January 1, 2006. As hoped, the implementation of this program resulted in a
dramatic increase of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in prescription drug coverage, from about
67% being enrolled in some prescription drug plan before 2006, to nearly 90% enrolled after
2006 (Yin, 2008; Duggan et al., 2008). Research on the effects of Medicare Part D on out-
of-pocket spending for pharmaceuticals also suggests a positive improvement for Medicare
beneficiaries. Yin (2008) estimate a decline in out-of-pocket costs of 13%, and Ketcham and
Simon (2008) find a similar decline of 17%. Furthermore, research in the health-services
literature also finds that Medicare Part D led to lower rates of hospitalization for seniors
with conditions that could be controlled through medication (Afendulis et al., 2011).
Additional research has found that the Medicare Part D program increased utilization of
prescription drugs in the home by the elderly (Engelhardt and Gruber, 2011). Lichtenberg
and Sun (2007) find that the program reduced costs among the elderly by 18.4% and increased
their use of prescription drugs by 12.8%. This resulted in an overall increase in prescription
drug usage in the United States by 4.5%. Additionally, this increase in demand led to an
increase in revenues for pharmaceutical firms (Duggan and Scott Morton, 2010). Given
these favorable outcomes, economic theory suggests following Medicare Part D, firms were
more likely to allocate resources to Phase III trials for prescription drug products that target
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illnesses commonly faced by seniors than they were before the announcement of the program.
3.3.1 A Case Study
An example of the response to Medicare Part D Legislation can be seen in drugs formulated
for in-home use targeting the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease. Alzheimer’s disease affects
nearly only those patients 65 and older (who would qualify for Medicare and Medicare Part
D) and nearly all potential therapies have been designed as small molecule capsules and
tablets for daily use in the home. And the disease is not rare, therefore making it a good
initial indication to explore when considering the responses of firms to Medicare Part D.
Using data from Informa’s BiomedTracker, I find that between 1995 and 2003 (the “pre”
MMA period), 16 compounds were taken to at least Phase II clinical trials and only four
of those were taken to at least Phase III (25%). In 2004 alone, immediately following the
announcement of the passage of the MMA, 5 of the 6 drugs in Phase II at the time were
taken to Phase III (83%). However, none of these drugs were ultimately approved.
In past studies of the effects of market size on innovation, this effect would have gone
unnoticed. Because it did not lead to any new drugs for Alzheimer’s disease, consumers
would not have benefited. Additionally, any study that just looked at patent creation would
not have seen the effect on the increase in investments in development. And finally, if
firms did not increase their innovation budget, one may have seen an aggregate decrease in
new products approved, as money was being shifted from other potentially more promising
products to the failed trials for Alzheimer’s disease.
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3.3.2 Data
To rigorously explore these investment decisions, I construct a dataset that contains proper-
ties of the drug (therapeutic classes and subclasses, indication, pharmacological class, target,
etc.) and the properties of the company developing the drug (public status, age, number of
successful past projects). The data on pipeline dates and decisions comes from Informa’s
BiomedTracker.
To begin, I explore how investment in clinical trials changes at the time of the policy
change. Figure 3.2 illustrates the number of Phase II and Phase III clinical trials for all firms.
It is immediately apparent that the number of Phase II clinical trials have been increasing
rapidly over the ten year period graphed. While the number of Phase III clinical trials
has also increased, they do not appear to be increasing at the same rate as Phase II trials.
Figure 3.3 confirms this. This graph illustrates the percentage of Phase II clinical trials that
continue to Phase III. There is some variation over the time period, but the general trend
appears to be moving downward.
However, looking only at these two charts provides only a limited perspective of how
firms are behaving. A researcher who estimates innovation using clinical trial counts may
conclude that firms are getting increasingly innovative over the time period, as observed by
the upward trend in Figure 3.2. By looking only at Figure 3.3, one may worry that firms are
becoming less capable over time, as the percentage of failed Phase II trials are increasing. In
the empirical section, I will demonstrate evidence that these trends are at least partly driven
by changing resource allocation strategies following the demand shock driven by Medicare
Part D.
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Figure 3.2: This graph illustrates the number of Phase II and Phase III clinical trials for
all firms in the sample from 1998-2009.
.
Figure 3.3: This graph illustrates the proportion of Phase II clinical trials that continue
to Phase III over time.
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The collected sample spans 1998-2008 and includes companies that were active before the
passage of the MMA. I choose to truncate the sample at 2008 because I want to consider only
those projects that were begun prior to the announcement of the MMA, and it takes longer
than 4 years for firms to take a new drug to go from discovery to Phase III trials. That is,
I want to consider only how established firms treat projects already under development in
response to this external change. I do not want the results to be confounded with potential
changes in the early stage drug-selection strategy. Equally as important, I do not want the
results to be confounded with a revenue effect. If, as studies show, pharmaceutical companies
experienced increased profits from the implementation of Medicare Part D, then it could be
the increase in revenues driving riskier resource allocation decisions. By truncating the period
at 2008, I can obtain enough power for statistical inference while mitigating the potential
effects of increased revenues. As one would expect, the results become stronger and larger as
I extend the time period outward. Additionally, I find that the results are directionally and
statistically robust to contractions in the time period. As a limitation, one thing I cannot
control for is the possibility of cheaper financing available to firms immediately following the
passage of the MMA.
The sample consists of 659 companies that were active (e.g. had a project reach Phase
II) in the time period. The largest company in my data is Novartis, with 280 products that
reached at least Phase II from 1998-2008, followed by GlaxoSmithKline (260 products) and
then Pfizer (230 products). The mean number of products for the firms in this dataset is
26.87. They span 21 different therapeutic groups with the largest being oncology (1,627
products) followed by autoimmune/immunology (673 products). I include small molecules,
biologics, and vaccines. I do not include data on the development of any generic products
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
1998-2008
Companies 659
Average Age of Company in 2008 31 years
Median Age of Company in 2008 16.6 years
Divisions
Average Number of Divisions 2.28
Median Number of Divisions 1
Maximum Number of Divisions 15
This table outlines basic statistics regarding all
firms in the sample of data. Data from BioMed-
Tracker.
or biosimilars. Table 3.1 presents additional statistics regarding the sample.
3.4 Identification and Empirical Specification
Past studies on the role of aggregate innovation (measured often in either clinical trial counts
or FDA approvals) have often identified an econometric model by using a difference-in-
differences analysis. Since Medicare Part D was hypothesized to increase demand for pre-
scription drugs for the elderly, a researcher could categorize indications as either Medicare-
heavy (the average age of incidence of the disease was greater than 65) or non-Medicare-heavy
(the average age of onset was lower than 65). Then, using a difference-in-differences analysis,
they could estimate the effect of the policy on the change in clinical trials for Medicare-heavy
indications.
One critique of this method is that the parallel trends assumption may not hold, which
is crucial for identification (Besley and Case, 2000). If pharmaceutical firms develop drugs
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according to expected demographic trends, as suggested in work by Acemoglu and Linn
(2004) and Cerda (2007), then it could be that firms were already beginning to shift resources
towards pharmaceuticals for the elderly. Therefore, it is possible that development of drugs
for the elderly was already beginning to outpace development for the younger demographic,
and one may erroneously believe this was driven by the policy change. Fortunately, the
nature of the Medicare Part D legislation provides an alternative way to explore this this
issue to mitigate potential concerns about this difference-in-differences identification strategy.
There are two primary groups who purchase drugs. Hospitals purchase drugs to use for
inpatient and outpatient treatment. And consumers purchase drugs to use in the home. Since
drugs taken in hospitals were already covered under traditional Medicare and Medicare Part
B, Medicare Part D only extended coverage to those pharmaceuticals purchased by consumers
for home use. Therefore, if firms were organically increasing their rate of development for
Medicare drugs external to the incentives provided by Medicare Part D, this should have
been changing both in the rate they were developing drugs for hospital use by the elderly,
and those designed for in-home use by the elderly.
I can exploit this policy intricacy to create a difference-in-difference-in-differences (or
“triple difference”) econometric specification. The first difference comes from the time period
(pre or post MMA passage). The second difference comes from the difference in development
between drugs of which the majority of their users will be elderly United States citizens and
those for which this will not be the larger customer segment. I segment these drugs in the
data by doing the following: I consider a molecule-indication dyad to be part of the Medicare
relevant group if (1) it is not a pediatric, juvenile, or congenital condition (as determined by
average age of diagnosis) and (2) it treats a condition unrelated to fertility or child-bearing
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and (3) it is not being tested to treat a purely cosmetic issue which would likely not be
covered by insurance (eg. “wrinkles”, “photodamage”) and (4) it is not a tropical disease.4
The third difference comes from the intended final purchaser of the drug: the hospital
or the patient. One would expect the introduction of Medicare Part D to only incentivize
development for pharmaceuticals for which patients are the end purchaser. I use the following
criteria to classify the likely end purchaser of the pharmaceutical: I consider a molecule-
indication dyad to be developed for patient purchase if (1) the route of administration is
either topical or oral (2) the route of administration is injectable but it treats a chronic
condition (eg. type 2 diabetes). An example of drugs that would not be in this segment are
intravenous fluids and imaging agents.
Past literature in strategy and economics that employs the MMA as an exogenous shock
has used a slightly different measurement approach. Using the publicly available Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), researchers have scored diseases based on the proportion
of survey respondents that reported having the disease and benefiting from Medicare (Blume-
Kohout and Sood, 2013; Hermosilla and Wu, 2018). Then, using a difference-in-differences
specification, the researchers estimate changes in the DV following the MMA passage as a
function of the MMA score (a continuous value between 0 and 1). This approach has some
advantages over the one employed here, namely that it identifies Medicare-relevant diseases
using a continuous measure, rather than a discrete classifier. However, one downside of this
measure is that, due to the nature of the MEPS data, its classification of diseases must
remain relatively broad, and many disease will not be included.
4Tropical diseases are defined by the World Health Organization as disease that occur solely, or principally
in the tropics, and are therefore uncommon in the United States (where Medicare coverage would be relevant).
Examples of tropical diseases include malaria, African trypanosomiasis, Chagas disease, and dengue.
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Another potential downside of past approaches is the lack of consideration for the types
of drugs already covered by Medicare parts A and B. This is particularly true for cancer
drugs, which constitute one of the largest therapeutic classes in the pipeline data. The vast
majority of cancer treatments were already covered by Medicare Parts A and B prior to the
passage of the MMA and remain covered by those programs today (Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services, 2017). Only a few types of drugs, including anti-nausea and those
related to cancer pain are covered by Medicare Part D. Without carefully accounting for the
final payer of these drugs, these studies will classify many hospital-based drugs incorrectly
by using only the age distribution of patients taking those drugs (which are skewed toward
the elderly).
The final downside of past approaches is that pharmaceutical firms may have already
been anticipating an increase in the Medicare-relevant population even before the MMA
was passed. Acemoglu and Linn (2004) showed that pharmaceutical firms developed drugs
based on expectations of future demographics, and so found that there was already a pre-
MMA increase in the development of drugs for the elderly. Therefore, the parallel trends
assumption of these prior studies may not hold. By incorporating the third difference, I
can control for the fact that after the MMA, firms were incentivized to develop only those
drugs that would be taken by the elderly and covered by Medicare Part D. Therefore, I can
difference away any trend from an increase in drugs that generally targeted the elderly.
To model these changes in investment decisions, I assume that Pr(Phase III|Phase II)
takes the functional form in Equation 3.2, as is common in the consumer choice literature.
Here, the choice could be interpreted as the project manager’s (or CEO’s) decision to invest
in Phase III clinical trials or terminate the project given both the characteristics of the drug
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and the state of the competitive environment.
Pr(Phase III|Phase II) = exp(Xβ)
1 + exp(Xβ)
(3.2)
Then using a logit transformation, I can rewrite the model as using a basic triple-
difference specification as is presented in Equation 3.3. I will estimate this as a first pass
(column 1 of all regression tables). The dependent variable, Pr(Phase III|Phase II) is then
the difference in the probability of continuing to Phase III for those products affected by
the policy change. Empirically, this is estimated using a binary variable equal to 1 if firm r
decides to invest in Phase III trials at time t for molecule i intended to treat indication j.
It is equal to 0 if at time t (the end of Phase II trials) the firm terminates the development
of that product. The parameter Λ represents the logit equation such that everything inside
is the score. The variable Medicare is equal to 1 if the disease being treated is one that will
be subject to any Medicare Part D reimbursement and the variable Market is equal to 1 if
the drug will be administered at a hospital or a physician’s office.
Pr(Phase III|Phase II) = Λ(β0 + β1Marketi + β2Medicarej + β3postt + β4Market*Medicareij
+ β5Market*postit + β6Medicare*postjt + β7Market*Medicare*postijt
+ ijrt)
(3.3)
While this equation estimates the effects of the policy on investment decisions, one may be
worried that it suffers from omitted variable bias. As described in the theoretical framework
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above, the decision to invest in Phase III clinical trials depends on a number of factors.
Most importantly, it depends on the firm’s estimate of its costs of developing the drug, the
potential benefits, and its subjective assessment of how likely it is to be approved. Therefore,
I want to control for additional factors that may influence a firm’s assessment of the project.
The full regression specification then becomes
Pr(Phase III|Phase II) = Λ(β0 + β1Payeri + β2Medicarej + β3Postt + β4Payer*Medicareij
+ β5Payer*postit + β6Medicare*postjt + β7Payer*Medicare*postijt
+ γXijt + µt + δr + τj + ijrt)
(3.4)
Here, X is a vector of project covariates, µt is a vector of 10 year fixed effects and δr
is a vector of company fixed effects. The year fixed effects are intended to control for any
macro-trends in the way in which companies make decisions about Phase III clinical trials.
For example, if techniques for judging the quality of drugs at Phase II get better over time,
this may result in all firms pursuing fewer Phase III clinical trials over time. Year fixed
effects are one way to keep from conflating these macro-level trends with the effects of the
policy.
Company fixed effects are another important control in this estimation given evidence
suggesting they are important for measuring firm-specific investment. Past research demon-
strates there is considerable heterogeneity among firms in how they make investment deci-
sions in clinical trials. There is a growing literature exploring how willing companies are
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to devote resources to products that they have incomplete information about (Arora et al.,
2009; Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004; Jekunen, 2014). Many of these differences are a function
of company size, funding, and the presence of viable outside options.
The number of Phase III trials initialized by the average firm stays relatively consistent
across the time period though hits its maximum just around the passage of the MMA (2003-
2004). These statistics are presented in Table 3.2.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Implication for Firm Investment Decisions
Figure 3.4 presents a simple bar graph of the total number of Phase III trials by type of
drug: those will likely be effected by Medicare Part D (“MMA Related”) and those that will
not (“non-MMA Related”). On the surface, it appears that the number of Phase III trials
for the MMA-related drugs is growing at a faster rate than for the non-MMA drugs, and
even surpasses the number by 2007. While this is suggestive of the effects of Medicare Part
D, it does not control for the many factors involved in drug development.
In exploring the trends of Phase III investment by drug type and year (either MMA-
relevant or Non-MMA relevant) a more nuanced picture emerges. This graph is presented in
Figure 3.5. Prior to the creation of Medicare Part D, the probability that a drug in Phase II
would continue to Phase III is very high, though slowly decreasing for both groups. However,
following the policy change, it appears the transition probability is decreasing at a fast rate
for those drugs not subject to potential revenue increases.
Results from estimation of Equations 3.3 and 3.4 are presented in Table 3.3. I find a
coefficient on the difference-in-differences measure of 25.70 on the preferred specification
(column 4). When calculating the marginal coefficients on the triple difference coefficient as
suggested by Ai and Norton (2003), I find this translates into a treatment effect of 44%.5
This suggests there is a substantial increase in the probability of one of the MMA-related
5This triple interaction effect is calculated as the discrete triple difference ∆
3F (u)
∆x1∆x2∆x3
where F (u) =
1
1+e−β1x1+β2x2+β3x3+β12x1x2+β13x1x3+β23x2x3+β123x1x2x3
. Standard errors are calculated according to Cor-
nelißen and Sonderhof (2009). The treatment effect is nearly identical when assuming a probit functional
form or a linear probability model.
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Figure 3.4: This figure presents a simple bar graph of the total number of Phase III trials
by type of drug: those will likely be effected by Medicare Part D (“MMA Related”) and
those that will not (“Non-MMA Related”). A drug that is considered MMA Related has
both of the following: the majority of users will be elderly United States citizens and the
drug will be available for use in a hospital. I consider a molecule-indication dyad to be part
of the Medicare relevant group if (1) it is not a pediatric, juvenile, or congenital condition (as
determined by average age of diagnosis) and (2) it treats a condition unrelated to fertility or
child-bearing and (3) it is not being tested to treat a purely cosmetic issue which would likely
not be covered by insurance (eg. “wrinkles”, “photodamage”) and (4) it is not a tropical
disease. I consider a molecule-indication dyad to be developed for customer purchase (e.g.
NOT hospital purchase) if (1) the route of administration is either topical or oral (2) the
route of administration is injectible but it treats a chronic condition (e.g. type 2 diabetes).
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Figure 3.5: This figure presents a line graph of the average transition probability by type
of drug: those will likely be effected by Medicare Part D (“MMA Related”) and those that
will not (“Non-MMA Related”). A drug that is considered MMA Related has both of the
following: the majority of users will be elderly United States citizens and the drug will
be available for use in a hospital. I consider a molecule-indication dyad to be part of the
Medicare relevant group if (1) it is not a pediatric, juvenile, or congenital condition (as
determined by average age of diagnosis) and (2) it treats a condition unrelated to fertility or
child-bearing and (3) it is not being tested to treat a purely cosmetic issue which would likely
not be covered by insurance (eg. “wrinkles”, “photodamage”) and (4) it is not a tropical
disease. I consider a molecule-indication dyad to be developed for customer purchase (e.g.
NOT hospital purchase) if (1) the route of administration is either topical or oral (2) the
route of administration is injectible but it treats a chronic condition (e.g. type 2 diabetes).
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drugs continuing on to Phase III following the policy change. The coefficient is significant at
the 1% level under robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level (Bertrand et al., 2004).
Additionally, the relevant coefficient in all specifications is positive and highly significant
and is robust under contractions in the time period considered (see Appendix Table B1).
This provides evidence that firms do change their later-stage resource allocation criteria in
response to changes in expected demand.
3.5.2 Implication for Investment Performance
One implication of the framework developed initially is that products do not continue to
Phase III for one of two reasons: (1) the firm’s belief about the probability of approval is
low or (2) the expected revenue that the product will generate is not high enough. Because
all that has changed is the expected revenue for the firm (these products were already in
development when the law was passed) and one can assume that the firm’s beliefs about the
probability of approval did not systematically change for any of the drugs in development
following the passage of the MMA, it is likely that the relevant case is (2). This implies all
else equal, one should see a decrease in the probability of approval for these drugs following
the passage of the MMA. This would then imply that a firm is taking a bigger risk in their
innovation pursuits and possibly allocating more resources to lower quality products.
Consider Figure 3.6, which illustrates the probability of FDA approval, given investment
in Phase III clinical trials, over the time period. In general, the probability of being approved
by the FDA decreases slightly, and only hovers above 50% before 2002. This underscores
again how risky an investment Phase III trials can be for a firm. In breaking these out
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Table 3.3: Impact of Increased Demand on Change in Probability of
Investment in Phase III Clinical Trials
Logit DDD Model
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received Phase III Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post 12.07∗∗∗ 11.24∗∗∗ 11.83∗∗∗ 25.70∗∗∗
(0.98) (1.13) (1.15) (1.94)
Medicare 0.575 0.529 0.758 0.882
(0.67) (0.69) (0.70) (0.95)
Payer 12.70∗∗∗ 11.95∗∗∗ 12.82∗∗∗ 26.80∗∗∗
(0.78) (0.89) (0.95) (1.83)
Post -1.954∗∗ -0.913 -1.284 -0.901
(0.81) (1.06) (1.06) (1.27)
Payer*Post -12.00∗∗∗ -11.11∗∗∗ -11.69∗∗∗ -25.84∗∗∗
(0.89) (1.04) (1.06) (1.95)
Medicare*Post -12.36∗∗∗ -11.56∗∗∗ -12.31∗∗∗ -25.58∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.97) (1.00) (1.74)
Medicare*Payer -12.36∗∗∗ -11.56∗∗∗ -12.31∗∗∗ -59.15∗∗∗
(0.81) (0.97) (0.99) (3.41)
Year FE N Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N N Y Y
Company FE N N N Y
Observations 1825 1779 1773 1365
R2 0.11 0.40 0.47 0.61
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product began Phase III clinical trials given
that it completed Phase II clinical trials. The variable Medicare is an indicator equal
to 1 if the disease being treated is one that will be subject to any Medicare Part D
reimbursement. This variable Payer is an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed
for the pharmacy, rather than hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal
to 1 if the Phase II trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA
was signed into law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January 1,
2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
95
.Figure 3.6: The Probability of FDA Approval given Phase III Investment.
into MMA-relevant drugs and non-MMA relevant drugs, it is evident the proportion of
approved drugs begins skewing more towards the MMA market following the passage of
the law (Figure 3.7). This could be seen as confirmation of the common finding within the
economics literature that as markets grow, the number of innovations catering to that market
grows as well.
To test my hypothesis, I subset my sample to only those drugs that continued to Phase
III trials. The dependent variable, Pr(Approved|Phase III), then becomes the change in the
probability of FDA approval, and is estimated using an indicator equal to 1 if the product was
approved by the FDA and 0 if it was not. I then estimate the version of the triple-difference
regression presented in Equation 3.5.
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Figure 3.7: This figure presents a line graph of the number of FDA approved drugs by type
: those will likely be effected by Medicare Part D (“MMA Related”) and those that will not
(“non-MMA Related”). A drug that is considered MMA Related has both of the following:
the majority of users will be elderly United States citizens and the drug will be available
for use in a hospital. I consider a molecule-indication dyad to be part of the Medicare
relevant group if (1) it is not a pediatric, juvenile, or congenital condition (as determined by
average age of diagnosis) and (2) it treats a condition unrelated to fertility or child-bearing
and (3) it is not being tested to treat a purely cosmetic issue which would likely not be
covered by insurance (eg. “wrinkles”, “photodamage”) and (4) it is not a tropical disease.
I consider a molecule-indication dyad to be developed for customer purchase (e.g. NOT
hospital purchase) if (1) the route of administration is either topical or oral (2) the route of
administration is injectible but it treats a chronic condition (e.g. type 2 diabetes).
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Pr(Approved|Phase III) = Λ(β0 + β1Payeri + β2Medicarej + β3Post + β4Payer*Medicareij
+ β5Payer*postit + β6Medicare*postjt + β7Payer*Medicare*postijt
+ γXijt + µt + δr + ijrt)
(3.5)
The results of this estimate are presented in Table 3.4. The coefficient on the difference-
in-differences estimator is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in all spec-
ifications and is robust under contractions in the time period considered (see Appendix
Table B2). This lends support for the hypothesis that firms were investing in marginally
lower quality drugs following the policy change, because these drugs were much less likely
to be approved. When calculating the marginal effect, I find an effect of -0.47, implying a
substantial decrease in the probability of approval for those drugs moving to Phase III.
These results provide a novel look at how sudden changes in demand may actually lead
firms to invest in less promising technologies. That is, the empirical evidence suggests the
introduction of the policy lead to the substitution away from possibly higher quality products
toward lower quality products (where quality is still defined here as the probability that the
drug will be approved). This can be seen by the increase is probability of undertaking
expensive advanced trials, followed by the decrease in the probability of receiving approval
to market the product.
As an additional test of the hypothesis that on average, lower quality or more marginally
beneficial products in this class were being pursued, one can look at the trajectory of those
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Table 3.4: Impact of Increased Demand on Change in Probability of
Approval Following Investment in Phase III Clinical Trials
Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received FDA Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post -2.075∗∗ -2.032∗∗ -2.049∗∗ -3.134∗∗
(1.03) (1.01) (0.98) (1.48)
Medicare -1.203∗∗ -1.278∗∗ -1.024∗ -1.176
(0.58) (0.60) (0.61) (0.96)
Payer -1.764∗ -1.707∗ -1.505∗ -2.290
(0.97) (0.97) (0.90) (1.48)
Post -1.090∗ -0.881 -1.177 -1.258
(0.61) (0.76) (0.81) (1.05)
Payer*Post 2.172∗∗ 2.140∗∗ 2.242∗∗ 3.111∗∗
(1.05) (1.04) (1.00) (1.51)
Medicare*Post 0.732 0.838 0.838 0.969
(0.60) (0.59) (0.61) (0.77)
Medicare*Payer 1.728∗ 1.668∗ 1.561∗ 2.415∗
(0.95) (0.93) (0.84) (1.37)
Year FE N Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y Y Y
Company FE N N N Y
Observations 1265 1265 1265 939
R2 0.02 0.48 0.52 0.58
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product was approved by the FDA
and 0 if it was terminated during or after Phase III clinical trials. The variable
Medicare is an indicator equal to 1 if the disease being treated is one that
will be subject to any Medicare Part D reimbursement. This variable Payer is
an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed for the pharmacy, rather than
hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal to 1 if the Phase II
trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA was signed into
law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January 1, 2006.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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products that were actually approved following the MMA. Above, I had simplified the ap-
proval process by suggesting that firms that achieve good results in Phase III will submit
an NDA to the FDA and then, following the FDA’s review of the data, receive approval for
that indication. However, this relatively smooth process of moving from the end of clinical
trials to approval does not always happen. In addition, even if the drug is approved for some
subset of an indication, it may not be as broad as the firm had initially hoped for when
they filed the NDA. In the previous analyses, I had considered any approval related to that
molecule-indication to be a successful approval. This could have been overstating a firm’s
success because their drug may have actually been approved for a much less desirable market
than they had hoped for (for example, as a third line, rather than a first line, treatment for
cancer).
While I do not have data on how the exact nature of FDA approval differs from the
firm’s first drug or biologic application, I will explore the following as a possible proxy. I
will rely on the fact that the FDA maintains a strict review timeline process as directed by
the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA). PDUFA, passed in 1992, allowed the FDA to
collect application fees from pharmaceutical firms in exchange for meeting review timeline
benchmarks. Under PDUFA, the FDA has ten months to review an NDA or BLA (six
months if the product received priority review).
If a firm’s application is not approved by the FDA after the set timeline, the firm will
receive a Complete Response Letter (CRL) from the FDA.6 In this case, the firm has the
option to redo some clinical trials and collect new data that will satisfy the concerns of the
6The FDA did not begin using CRLs for small molecules until 2008, to replace what had previously been
either “Approvable” letters or “Non-approvable” letters. They had been standard for biologics since 1998.
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FDA. If the firm or the FDA determines the deficiencies are insurmountable, the firm will
withdraw the NDA and terminate the project. According to my interviews with industry
experts, even if a firm is able to get an approval for this drug, it will often be for a smaller
subset of an indication, or for a population that does not respond to anything else on the
market. Sometimes a firm will receive many CRLs for one drug, as they keep repeating the
process of collecting new data and resubmitting the application. While not only harmful
to firm value (which usually declines with every CRL) this is incredibly costly in time and
resources. It can cost pharmaceutical firms up to $8 million for every extra day that a drug
is in Phase III clinical trials (Miseta, 2013), so having to redesign and execute new trials is
an unfortunate outcome, even if the firm does eventually receive FDA approval.
For my identification strategy in this analysis, I will assume that “lower quality” NDAs
will ultimately take longer to get eventual FDA approval, likely because it will require
more back-and-forth with the FDA to reach a consensus regarding for who the drug can be
approved. I can do this by collecting information on the first filing date of the NDA and
the eventual date of approval. If it is true that “lower quality” drugs targeting the Medicare
segment were being taken further in clinical trials, it may also be the case that even those
that were approved received designations for indications that were not as broad as originally
intended. While the FDA can grant itself review extensions, it is unlikely that they will
systematically grant themselves review extensions primarily on the MMA-relevant class post
2003.
The model I use is similar to that presented in Equations 3.4 and 3.5, except that I
consider only approved products and explore the time it took (in days) to move from the
filing of an NDA to FDA approval. The econometric equation I will estimate is presented
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below. Since the dependent variable is continuous, I use a standard OLS difference-in-
differences style regression presented in Equation 3.6.
Log(Days to Approval) = β0 + β1Payeri + β2Medicarej + β3Post + β4Payer*Medicareij
+ β5Payer*postit + β6Medicare*postjt + β7Payer*Medicare*postijt
+ γXijt + µt + ijrt
(3.6)
Results are presented in Table 3.5. The positive and statistically significant coefficient
(though only at the 5% significance level) in all specifications suggest that firms pursuing
MMA-relevant drugs following Medicare expansion spent considerably more time under re-
view by the FDA. This provides some evidence that even for products that were approved
in this class, they may have not received the most desirable designations.7
3.6 Organizational Structure and Resource Allocation
In this analysis, I test Hypothesis 3 by reconducting the above analyses on a sample of firms
that are more diversified and a sample of less diversified firms. A crucial component of this
analysis is in deciding a cutoff for in which to classify firms as more or less diversified. As
possibilities, I consider (1) those firms in the top 90% in number of therapeutic divisions in
which they have been active and (2) those firms with a presence in multiple states and/or
countries. While the results are robust to both methods, I will present results for method
7It is also possible that this result suggests that firms were more careless with their applications (perhaps
because they were hoping to beat competitors to market?)
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Table 3.5: Impact of Demand Shock on Change in Time Spent Under FDA
Review for Approved Products
Dependent Variable: Log(Number of Days from Application to Approval)
(1) (2) (3)
Medicare*Payer*Post 0.988∗∗ 1.030∗∗ 0.940∗∗
(0.40) (0.41) (0.40)
Medicare 0.328∗ 0.254 0.219
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Payer 0.855∗∗ 0.899∗∗ 0.739∗∗
(0.36) (0.38) (0.37)
Payer*post -1.127∗∗∗ -1.204∗∗∗ -1.137∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.40) (0.39)
Medicare*Post -0.413∗∗ -0.331 -0.354∗
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Medicare*Payer -0.838∗∗ -0.843∗∗ -0.723∗
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38)
post 0.336∗ -0.0138 0.0168
(0.18) (0.20) (0.19)
Therapeutic Group Y Y Y
Approval Year FE N Y Y
Drug Classification FE N N Y
Observations 1024 1024 1024
R2 0.145 0.227 0.249
The dependent variable measured in days between NDA submission and FDA ap-
proval. The number of observations is lower than in Table 3.4 because not all ap-
provals had retrievable NDA dates. The variable Medicare is an indicator equal to 1
if the disease being treated is one that will be subject to any Medicare Part D reim-
bursement. This variable Payer is an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed for
the pharmacy, rather than hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal
to 1 if the Phase II trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA
was signed into law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January
1, 2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: List of Companies Active in Highest Number
of Therapeutic Classes
1998-2003
Number of Active Divisions
Company Name prior to 2003
Abbott Laboratories 6
Allergan 9
Astellas Pharma 7
AstraZeneca 9
Bausch + Lomb 8
Bristol-Myers Squibb 6
DRI Capital Inc. 9
Eli Lilly 7
Endo International 6
GlaxoSmithKline 10
Johnson & Johnson 10
Merck & Co. 10
Merck KGaA 7
Novartis 9
Otsuka Holdings 7
Pfizer 9
Roche 10
Sanofi 10
This table lists all companies flagged as “highly diversified” in
the analyses and gives the number of therapeutic divisions in
which the firm was actively developing products prior to 2003.
Data are from BioMedTracker.
(1) in Table 3.7. The list of companies classified as most diversified by this method (6 or
more divisions) are listed in Table 3.6.
After splitting the sample and rerunning the triple-difference regressions separately, I
find compelling support for Hypothesis 3. The coefficient on the relevant coefficient, Medi-
care*Payer*Post is positive and significant only for that sample consisting of firms that are
arguable more centralized and focus on fewer therapeutic classes than the sample with the
large, diversified/decentralized firms.
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Table 3.7: Impact of Increased Demand on Change in Probability of
Investment in Phase III Clinical Trials and Probability of Approval
Logit Model
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received Phase III Investment
Fewer than 6 Divisions 6 or More Divisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post 12.95∗∗∗ 27.11∗∗∗ -1.106 -1.351
(1.49) (2.32) (1.58) (1.85)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y N Y
Company FE N Y N Y
Observations 739 739 1001 1001
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received FDA Approval
Fewer than 6 Divisions 6 or More Divisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post -3.026∗ -17.40∗∗∗ -1.620 -2.407
(1.68) (2.09) (1.62) (1.72)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y N Y
Company FE N Y N Y
Observations 505 342 760 587
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product began Phase III clinical trials given
that it completed Phase II clinical trials. The variable Medicare is an indicator equal
to 1 if the disease being treated is one that will be subject to any Medicare Part D
reimbursement. This variable Payer is an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed
for the pharmacy, rather than hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal
to 1 if the Phase II trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA
was signed into law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January 1,
2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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There is some reason to be concerned that the changing nature of Medicare reimbursement
for oncology services at this time may be biasing the results. Because many all oncology
services will be classified as “Non-MMA”, it may be that part of the move away from Non-
MMA therapies toward MMA therapies may be mostly driven by less enthusiasm for investing
in Phase III clinical trials for cancer. After dropping all oncology projects and re-estimating
Equations 3.3 through 3.6, I find that the direction and statistical significance of the results
stay unaltered. These results are reported in Appendix Tables B3-B5.
3.7 Discussion
This study explores how a firm’s investment strategy responds immediately following chang-
ing expectations in future demand. It differs from past studies in the literature in that it
focuses not on the direct effect on the quantity of products reaching a market but rather
on how it changes the allocation of resources across an R&D department. When exploring
these effects in the aggregate, I find that when expectations about future demand suddenly
shift, firms increase their investments in products that are less likely to be approved, all else
equal. Using a standard economic model of investment decisions, I demonstrate why this
change in criteria may actually result in fewer approved products (or more “failed” prod-
ucts) as firms substitute resources away from higher quality products to lower quality ones.
This hypothesis is substantiated by my empirical results. Empirically, I find that firms in-
crease their propensity to invest in a certain segment of products after they believe there will
be an increase in demand from that segment. Additional empirical evidence demonstrates
that because of this, firms have lower total rates of approval than they would have in the
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counter-factual scenario. This may be one reason for decreased efficiency in pharmaceutical
R&D.
As an additional contribution, this study contributes to work on firm structure, decen-
tralization, and product diversification and furthers the conversation on how organizational
structure may lead to differing strategies following a positive shock. While there are known
benefits to decentralization, this study addresses some of the downsides of this structure
when there is a sudden change in priorities. While I observe smaller, centralized firms real-
locating resources towards the newly higher valued products, I find no evidence that their
larger counterparts were able to do the same.
One limitation of this study is that I cannot address whether or not this change in
behavior is either “good” strategy or “bad” strategy. There are reasons to believe that firms
were better off following the policy despite the effects on innovation. This is because even
if a firm brings fewer products to market following a change in criteria, those products that
they do develop may bring in more revenue, and therefore actually increase returns to the
firm. Duggan and Scott Morton (2010) find some evidence that revenues grew for those
Medicare-intensive drugs already on the market, however, there has been no attempts to
measure the causal effect of Medicare Part D on total value captured by the firm. However,
like much of the capital allocation literature, understanding the causal nature of allocation
and firm performance is outside the scope of this study.
However, the empirical results suggest one reason firms may not have behaved optimally.
By investing in Phase III trials for riskier molecules, firms were tying up scarce non-monetary
resources (lab space, scientists) for potentially more successful molecules. One industry pub-
lication stresses the importance of proper resource allocation by noting that “If doomed
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drugs can dodge Phase III, you save that money to reinvest in other potentially more suc-
cessful compounds” (Lam, 2004). From a consumer welfare perspective, the interpretation
is also mixed. On the one hand, these analyses suggest consumers may have had fewer new
therapies available following the passage of the MMA. On the other hand, because these
resources were being devoted to more novel innovations (though using a very conservative
definition of novel), some fraction of consumers may have indeed benefitted.
This study merely scratches the surface of how policy shocks may impact a firm’s innova-
tion strategy. While I provide evidence that it may effect a firm’s resource allocations in the
short run, these changes may also affect the future trajectory of innovation, organizational
learning and long run firm performance. I will leave these issues to future research.
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Chapter 4 Old Wine in a New Bottle: Market Effects
of Product Repurposing
4.1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has drawn increased attention to how pharmaceuticals are discov-
ered, developed and brought to market. As firms and government agencies try to quickly
develop an effective therapy, one strategy is receiving fresh attention: that of drug repur-
posing. Drug repurposing (or repositioning, reprofiling, or re-tasking) is being pursued in
this pandemic because it is both quicker and less risky than the traditional drug discovery
process. Repurposing involves taking a drug that is already approved or has been heavily
studied for another disease (or “indication”) and testing its therapeutic abilities in COVID-
19 patients. So far, over twenty compounds that have already completed Phase I clinical
trials have been identified as potential therapies, and many of the drugs being considered as
possible candidates are those already approved for other indications (Andersen et al., 2020;
Shah et al., 2020). These include older drugs that have already penetrated the over-the-
counter market, such as the active compound in the heartburn drug Pepcid (Borrell, 2020).
However, even recently developed drugs, including the Ebola vaccine, are being explored for
109
their potential to treat the disease (Niarchos, 2020). This differs from developing a drug
“from scratch” in that the organization can bypass the discovery and preclinical process and
often the human safety trials. By repurposing an already approved drug, an organization
and shave years off the drug development process and save millions (to billions) of dollars.
The repurposing of drugs has often been a function of serendipity. This was true in the
case of Thalidomide, the notorious drug once used to treat morning sickness in expectant
mothers.1 Decades later, it was found to be an effective treatment of multiple myeloma
and later, leprosy (Oprea and Mestres, 2012; Singhal et al., 1999). Oftentimes, successful
repurposing can be a revenue boon for the developing firm, as was the case with Viagra,
which was initially approved to treat angina (Novac, 2013). However, repurposing old, off-
patent drugs to treat new diseases can also benefit consumers as well. If an off-patent drug
is repositioned to treat a new disease, the developing firm cannot charge monopoly prices for
its use. So given the high prices of pharmaceutical drugs the possibility of drug repurposing
as a welfare-enhancing strategy receives considerable attention from public policy scholars
and consumer advocacy groups. Indeed, there is currently an expanding amount of public
awareness about the possibility that new cures could be found in already established drugs
(Fedson and Rordam, 2015; Harris, 2018). Following recent outbreaks of deadly viruses,
there has been increased effort from the scientific community to test old drugs for treating
respiratory viruses (BenevolentAI, 2020; Mullin, 2014; Senanayake, 2020). Academic insti-
tutions have also taken an interest in this endeavor (Oprea et al., 2011). The Broad institute
at MIT has created specific resources to facilitate the discovery of new uses for old drugs.
1Thalidomide was heavily marketed for treatment of morning sickness in the 1950s though was never
FDA approved for treatment. Once it was discovered to cause severe birth defects, this led to increased
regulation of the pharmaceutical industry resulting in the current regulatory process present in the United
States today.
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Recently, scientists there tested over 4,000 drugs on human cancer cells and determined that
nearly 50 had undiscovered anti-cancer properties (Corsello et al., 2020).
One scenario that has received less attention by journalists and academics is the repur-
posing of a drug that is still under patent protection. There are several reasons why a
pharmaceutical company may actively seek to repurpose a branded, on-patent drug for a
new indication. With the high cost of bringing a brand new molecule to market and ev-
idence of slowing R&D productivity in traditional drug discovery (Pammolli et al., 2011),
repurposing an already approved drug for a new market can be cost efficient while simul-
taneously benefitting underserved patient populations. Furthermore, because the molecule
has already been deemed safe and its pharmacokinetic properties well understood, firms can
benefit from shorter and cheaper Phase I and II clinical trials, as all the firm must do is
prove the drug’s effectiveness in treating the new disease (Pushpakom et al., 2019). This is
considered a winning proposition for both suppliers and patients. Finally, it is considered an
effective lifecycle management strategy for a pharmaceutical company. With the additional
approval comes three additional years of exclusivity for the drug, making it one of the most
pursued line extension strategies (Tiene, 2017).
While there are clear revenue benefits to a firm that repurposes a patented drug, there
is also the possibility further benefits, in the form of spillover demand into a drug’s other
approved indications. This question of the market effects of product expansion has important
implications for a firm and a competitor’s strategy. There are obvious, and heavily studied,
reasons why a company may want to differentiate a product by increasing the number of
functions that product can perform. By doing so, the product’s value may increase to the
initial consumers who value both functions and the product will attract new consumers
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who especially value the second function. However, this study differs from other product
proliferation studies in that it will explore the effects of a product expanding into a new
market that is orthogonal to the initial one. That is, I will explore products for which
its repurposing for a different use will likely not increase the value to the consumers using
the product for the initial use, though it will allow the firm to capture demand from a
new market. This would be akin to, for example, a firm expanding a product’s ability to
be used in China after being developed initially for use in the United States. While this
change would likely not increase the value of the product to U.S consumers, this increase
in aggregate demand for the product could impact demand in the United States through
indirect channels.
This chapter will look explicitly at the case of repurposing of oncology drugs for other
uses within oncology. Focusing on this therapeutic class is ideal for this project due to the
amount of repurposing of patent protected drugs that occurs within this group. In 2014,
over half of marketed oncology drugs treated multiple indications. It is predicted that by
the end of 2020, the number of oncology drugs treating multiple indications will be three
times greater than those approved for one indication (Mestre-Ferrandiz et al., 2015). And
while many of the headline stories in drug repurposing focus on one drug that may treat
two very different diseases, most repurposing occurs among indications that are similar
therapeutically (Baker et al., 2018). Importantly, these approvals for new cancers are often
granted sequentially, allowing us to observe the sales of drugs competing in that disease both
before a competitor receives a new approved disease and afterward. Furthermore, there have
been calls for companies to consider exploring their repurposing opportunities in cancer given
the limited therapies available and the higher likelihood that one drug can effectively treat
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several different tumor types (Gupta et al., 2013; Pantziarka et al., 2014).
The repurposing of oncology drugs to treat new types of cancer may result in changes
to demand patterns for not just the new indication but also among the indications for
which the drug was previously approved. If I observe changes to demand in the market
which had no new entrants, then repurposing may also hold strategic implications for a firm
and its competitors. This will further the conversation on the strategic benefits of product
proliferation and this specific case of drug repurposing. In this study, I find strong evidence
that as firms find new approvable indications for one cancer drug, it leads to increased sales
of that drug for treatment of the initially improved indication. Furthermore, I find that
competing drugs treating the initial disease and are in the same chemical subgroup also
receive a small but positive boost in demand following their competitor’s repurposing. I
do not find evidence that these demand spillovers are a result of increased advertising or
decreased pricing by close competitors as they anticipate the effects of repurposing. Further
analysis suggests that these are gains from business stealing of competitors in other chemical
subgroups. These findings align with theories of information and advertising spillovers.
4.2 Prior Literature and Regulatory Setting
4.2.1 Product expansion, repurposing and business stealing
This article contributes to the literatures on product expansion, business stealing, and phar-
maceutical repurposing. Questions regarding the role of product expansion on firm and
competitor outcomes have been explored to some extent in the product proliferation litera-
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ture. Much of this literature is interested in how product strategies impact firm performance.
In particular, this study has similarities with those exploring the effects of within-industry
product proliferation – the case where a firm sells two products to different submarkets within
the same industry (Barroso and Giarratana, 2013). For example, Siggelkow (2003) explores
the effects of product diversification within one industry. In looking at the performance of
mutual fund families, he finds that there are performance benefits to those firms that “focus”
on one fund category. He postulates that one reason for this could be that focused companies
attract people with similar interests and values therefore leading to a well-defined company
culture and image.
However, in a different study exploring technology start-ups Stern and Henderson (2004)
find that those that diversify the products they offer within a business unit tend to fare better
so long as the competitive landscape remains relatively stable. They argue that these benefits
are likely due to learning effects and experience accumulation as employees explore different
approaches and master new skills that are crucial to survive in a high-tech landscape. While
early research has explored the benefits of product proliferation as it relates to economies
of scope (Markides and Williamson, 1994) or risk-reduction (Hill and Hansen, 1991), more
recent studies in this literature have explored issues of within-industry diversification from
the lens of resource development and managerial cognition. (One noted exception is Li and
Greenwood (2004), who explore how increased diversification may facilitate multi-market
contact and collusion among firms, leading to increased performance as measured by rate of
return.) However, there is limited research exploring if and how product proliferation can
impact consumer demand. This is an important and overlooked potential mechanism for
which product proliferation may lead to improved firm performance.
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This chapter will also add to the literature on firm competition and business stealing.
When a new product successfully enters the market, that product has captured market share
by either expanding demand (Cao et al., 2018), stealing demand from competitors (Bernheim
and Madsen, 2017), or some combination of the two (Davis, 2006). In the industrial organi-
zation literature, entry that leads to business stealing is considered to be socially inefficient
and has therefore generated a long and productive research agenda (Mankiw and Whinston,
1986). This research suggests that industries likely to have inefficiently excessive entry are
those with large fixed costs to entry (including costly R&D) and low marginal costs (Berry
and Waldfogel, 1999) and products that are somewhat substitutable.
Much of this empirical literature in product business stealing explores the entry of firms
creating (somewhat) homogenous goods including radio stations and movie theaters. Ini-
tially, this requirement may seem ill-suited to describe the cancer drug market, for which
competitors must show improved safety and efficacy over the current therapy protocol to
receive FDA approval. However, I assert that the cancer drug market is more like the radio
stations market, the setting of the influential empirical study of business stealing by Berry
and Waldfogel (1999).
Like radio stations, cancer patients can only consume one drug at a time and while there
is some diversification among radio stations (including the types of music played or the
quality of the hosts) they are likely not substantial differences in preference orderings for
most consumers, making them largely substitutable. And while the narrative offered by drug
developers that there are large differences in safety and efficacy among the different cancer
therapies, there is increasing concern among industry experts that the increased efficacies of
each new drug are too marginal to make them significantly superior to their counterparts
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(Hanahan, 2014; Leaf, 2014; Prasad, 2020). Recently, oncologists themselves have argued
that new entrants to the cancer market offer limited benefits. For example, when Fojo
et al. (2014) survey 71 recently approved drugs treating solid tumors, they find a median
improvement in longevity of only 2.1 months. And Raza (2019) has argued that the illusion
of improved rates of cancer survival over the past few decades are due to earlier detection,
rather than improved therapies.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the competitive effects of drug repur-
posing.2 Presently, much of the academic literature on drug repurposing considers the case
where the drug to be repurposed is off-patent, and therefore unable to acquire monopoly
rents due competition from generic drugs. Because there is little incentive for pharmaceuti-
cal companies to explore new indications for off-patent drugs, economists and public policy
scholar have debated ways to encourage scientists and drug developers to undertake this sort
of welfare-enhancing research (Walson, 2012). The interested reader should refer to Roin
(2014) for an in-depth analysis of this “public policy failure” (Roin, 2014, p. 40).
This study is one of the first studies that, to my knowledge, explores the effects of
repurposing drugs that are still under patent protection. In this case, many of the benefits
derived from the reduced R&D risk of repurposing apply to this situation as well. Several
scholars within the industry have stressed the substantial costs and benefits to the firm that
chooses to focus its R&D efforts on repurposing already approved and/or heavily studied
drugs for new indications is a strategy that carries less risk that studying de novo molecules
(Ashburn and Thor, 2004; Novac, 2013). By exploring other opportunities for approved
2In the literature, drug repurposing can refer to the research of new indications for drugs that are ei-
ther already approved or failed in late stage (efficacy based) clinical trials. Here, I will only consider the
repurposing of drugs that have already been FDA approved.
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drugs, companies can skip the discovery and preclinical phase of R&D, saving hundreds of
millions of dollars (Sahoo, 2007). Furthermore, companies can harness already obtained
knowledge about the safety of the drug and its efficacy in a different disease, potentially
lowering the likelihood of a late-stage failure. However, there is no research yet that explores
the spillover and competitive effects of drug repurposing which could provide post-approval
benefits to the firm as well.
4.2.2 Regulatory environment in the U.S
The current regulatory environment faced by pharmaceutical companies in the United States
can be traced to the passage of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act in 1984, informally known as the “Hatch-Waxman” Act. The Act purported to provide
a delicate balance between easing the pathway for generic entry and continuing to provide
incentives for innovation (Grabowski, 2007). Under Hatch-Waxman, upon approval the FDA
grants each new drug regulatory protection lasting for five years (known as data exclusivity)
which runs concurrently with patent protection. During this data exclusivity period, regard-
less of the status of the underlying patent(s), no generic entry may occur. At the conclusion
of data exclusivity branded products are protected only by their patents; this period running
from the cessation of data exclusivity to patent expiration is commonly referred to as market
exclusivity.
Important for the current setting is the ability by firms to obtain three additional years of
data exclusivity for reformulations, which include: (a) reformulating the molecular entity; (b)
changing the manner of delivery; or (c) adding a new indication. Specifically, I am interested
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in the third type of reformulation focused on adding a new indication or repurposing. This
process includes additional clinical testing and another submission to the FDA for approval
but this is generally viewed as less expensive than the original approval.
Critically, the above discussion pertains only to chemical-based or small molecule drugs.
The Biologompetitics Products Cion and Innovation Act which was passed in 2009 governs
biologic-based or large molecule drugs. Biologic-based drugs receive 12 years of data exclu-
sivity (as opposed to the five-years for chemical-based drugs) but are ineligible for additional
data exclusivity protection for a new indication unless there are changes to the structure of
the biologic product that alter safety, purity or potency.
4.3 Theoretical Propositions
Consider two firms, Firm A and Firm B, that sell branded drugs, Drug A and Drug B within
the same 4-digit Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC4) market, respectively.3 While a
drug may be assigned to only one ATC code, approved treatments for a specific disease may
include drugs from several different ATC groups. Let’s assume that at time t = 0, both
drugs (Drug A and Drug B) treat the same indication, j. Firm A and Firm B compete
with each other in the market to garner patients (i.e., via price and/or direct-to-consumer
advertising) and by encouraging physicians to prescribe (i.e., via detailing or the practice of
sending sales representatives to physician offices).
Now, let’s consider what happens if at time t = 1, Drug B receives FDA approval for
a new indication k 6= j, which is in a different ATC4 therapeutic market. Drug B is now
3The ATC classification system, designed by the World Health Organization, divides drugs into groups
according to their anatomical annotation (https://www.whocc.no/atc_ddd_index/).
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Figure 4.1: A Diagram of the Research Question
approved to treat indication j and indication k 6= j while Drug A remains treating only
indication j. See Figure 4.1. While sales of Drug B will increase due to the treatment of
indication k 6= j, this research focuses on what, if anything, happens to both sales of Drug
B and Drug A for the treatment of indication j at time t = 1. I consider four plausible
competing explanations as to what may happen in the market.
Proposition 1: No Impact. The repurposing of Drug B into a new market to treat indi-
cation j 6= k has no effect on the market for indication j. I will consider this the baseline
case which implies that, ceterus paribus, physicians and patients do not prescribe or request
Drug A any differently. That is, when treating indication j, doctors do not prescribe Drug
A or Drug B at different rates than they had prior to the repurposing of Drug B.
Proposition 2: Business stealing from Firm B. The repurposing of Drug B into indi-
cation k 6= j spills over and increases the sales of Drug B for treating indication j thereby
lowering the sales of Drug A for treating indication j. This outcome could result for a num-
ber of reasons. First, Firm B increases its advertising and marketing efforts for indication
k 6= j or similarly, receives press coverage. This heightened awareness by physicians (and
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consumers) allows them to more easily recall Drug B’s name and benefits resulting in an
increased propensity to prescribe Drug B for indication j. The effects of pharmaceutical
advertising have been shown to be effective both in doctors Larkin et al. (2017)) and in
patients (e.g., Sinkinson and Starc, 2019). Moreover, these spillover effects are theorized to
be a driver behind brand extensions and are often observed empirically in other consumer
product markets (e.g., Aaker, 1996; Balachander and Ghose, 2003; Sahni, 2016). For exam-
ple, advertising spillovers help explain why demand increases for original flavor yogurt when
a firm increases its advertising for a new flavor.
Secondly, a halo effect might be created around Drug B because it now treats multiple
indications, has gone through additional clinical testing, and multiple FDA approval pro-
cesses. Drug B may also benefit from peer effects as other physicians begin to prescribe the
drug to treat indication k 6= j. These behavioral effects may make a physician feel more
confident and comfortable about Drug B thereby making them more likely to prescribe it
over Drug A for indication j. In either case, this would cause a business stealing effect from
Drug A to Drug B.
Proposition 3: Competitive pre-emption by Firm A. The repurposing of Drug B into
indication k 6= j leads to an increase in the sales of Drug A but a decline in sales of Drug
B to treat indication j, ceterus paribus. This could happen if Firm A, anticipating an
increase in advertising and marketing by Firm B, strategically responds by either increasing
their advertising and marketing or lowering the price for Drug A. The likelihood that a firm
retaliates via increased advertising and marketing is well documented in the economics and
marketing literature (e.g., Gatignon et al., 1989). Furthermore, if Firm B is focused on
120
increasing advertising and marketing for its new indication k 6= j, Firm A could use this
distraction to better target physicians specializing in indication j. These effects have been
explored in the literature on scarce resource allocation and product cannibalization (e.g.,
Roberts and McEvily, 2005).
Proposition 4: Market-level halo effects. Finally, it is possible that when Drug B is
repurposed for indication k 6= j that both Drug B and Drug A experience increases in sales
in the treatment of indication j. This would suggest that the halo effects created by Drug
B as it expands to treat indication k 6= j spills over into the entire class of drugs treating
indication j. For example, if a physician learns that Drug B has been shown to be safe and
efficacious for a new indication, k 6= j, she may become more comfortable prescribing Drug
A to treat indication j because she associates that class of drugs as a whole as safe and
effective.
This kind of spillover would be predicted by the literature exploring the impact of in-
formation and peer effects on sticky demand. Much of this literature explores the effects of
marketing, endorsements, and media depictions on sales of the relevant product and spillovers
to sales of other products. For example, Garthwaite (2014) finds that book endorsements
lead to business stealing from other book titles and that demand also spills over into other
books written by the endorsed author. In the pharmaceutical industry, the setting of this
study, there is a growing literature that explores demand spillovers; scholars have shown that
demand for one drug can be influenced by new information, new publicity, or an increase in
advertising for another drug (Sinkinson and Starc, 2019). Additionally, Shapiro (2018) finds
that demand for any antidepressant increases when one firm increases its advertising. This
121
suggests that new information (or simply an increased prevalence of information) about one
antidepressant makes consumers more likely to take any antidepressant.
4.4 Empirical Methodology and Data
4.4.1 Modeling drug repurposing and firm sales
When a firm receives approval for a new indication, I expect to see sales of the drug increase.
However, one may also see increased sales of the drug for its prior approved indications
as well. This could happen if there were spillover effects due to the announcement of the
approval for the new indication. To explore this, I consider the following regression specifi-
cation. For drug i treating indication j in quarter t, I explore the effect of sales for indication
j when the firm receives a new approval for indication k 6= j.
log(Quantity)ijt = α0 + β1Competitorsijt + β2Own Drug Repurposedijt
+ β3log(Lag Ad-spending)ijt + β4log(Price)ijt + β5Off-Patentijt
+ Year FEs + Indication FEs + (Indication x Year FEs) + ijt
(4.1)
where the dependent variable, Quantity, is the log of total standard units sold. Standard
units are determined by IQVIA and are meant to equate pills, tablets, capsules and liquid
doses. Competitors is a continuously updated count of the number of competing drugs for an
indication within a therapeutic market. I expect the sign of β1 to be negative; as the number
of competitors increase, they will begin to steal market share from incumbents. Own Drug
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Repurposed is an indicator equal to 1 if drug i treating indication j is approved for another
indication k 6= j, zero otherwise. β2 is the coefficient of interest and I expect a positive sign
if there is spillover effect to other indications treated by drug i.
Lag advertising includes direct promotion to physicians (otherwise known as detailing),
journal advertising and direct-mail advertising. Consistent with prior literature, β3 is ex-
pected to be positive. Price is the log of the price of drug i and β4 is expected to be negative.
To correct for the endogeneity of price, I use mean and median price of drugs within the
3-digit ATC therapeutic market as instruments and implement a 2SLS procedure.4 The
F-statistic on the first stage regression rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments. Off-
Patent is an indicator equal to 1 if drug i is subject to generic competition in time t. Again,
consistent with the literature, I expect β5 to be negative.
Finally, I include year and indication fixed effects along with an interaction between
the two to control for factors that vary within an indication over time. This is to control
for external factors that lead to changing rates of cancer treatment by type (location).
For example, there is evidence that rates of breast cancer were increasing over the period
(Schneider et al., 2014; Siegel et al., 2012). This could be for several reasons, including
increased early detection or a population that is living longer. By including indication fixed
effects, I can control for these external trends of treatment by type of cancer. The F statistic
on the first stage regression rejects the hypothesis of weak instruments. The variable Off-
Patent is an indicator equal to 1 if the drug has come off patent and is now subject to generic
competition. I expect β5 to be negative, as generic entry is shown to have a strong negative
impact the sales of its branded drug counterpart (Berndt, 2002; Grabowski et al., 2014).
4Results are robust to building instruments within the 2-digit ATC level.
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4.4.2 Modeling drug repurposing and competitor sales
Next, I model the impact of competitor repurposing into a new indication, k 6= j, on fo-
cal drug i sales in indication j. Competitors are defined as firms selling drugs within the
same ATC4 therapeutic market. For example, in the breast cancer market focused on aro-
matase inhibitors (ATC4 L2B3) the drugs Femara (Novartis), Arimidex (AstraZeneca), and
Aromasin (Pfizer) are all direct competitors. However, they do not compete directly with
Fareston and Nolvadex, which are estrogen modulators also approved to treat breast cancer.
In this case, interest is in the effect a repurposing of Arimidex has on sales of Femara. This
can be explored more generally in the following specification:
log(Quantity)ijt = α0 + β1Competitorsijt + β2Own Drug Repurposedijt
+ β3Competitor Drug Repurposedijt + β4log(Lag Ad-spending)ijt
+ β5log(Price)ijt + β6Off-Patentijt + Year FEs + Indication FEs
+ (Indication x Year FEs) + ijt
(4.2)
where all the variables remain the same as in Equation 4.1 except Competitor Drug
Repurposed which is defined as an indicator equal to 1 if competitor drug i treating indication
j is approved for another indication k 6= j, zero otherwise. The coefficient β3 thus represents
the possibility of a spillover from competitor repurposing on the sales of focal firm drug i
treating indication j.
In Equation 4.2, the “treated” sample contains a drug-indication dyad within an ATC4
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therapeutic market that is also approved for an indication for which the expanding drug
has also been previously approved. For example, Treanda is a drug in ATC4 therapeutic
market L1A0 first approved for chronic lymphocytic leukemia before receiving an additional
approval for indolent non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma in October 2008. In this case, the “treated”
sample consists of the sales of competing drugs in ATC4 therapeutic market L1A0 that also
treat chronic lymphocytic leukemia but not non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Excluded are sales
of any drugs that treat chronic lymphocytic leukemia approved after October 2008 and any
drugs treating chronic lymphocytic leukemia that are not in ATC4 therapeutic market L1A0,
of which there are four.
4.4.3 Data
I am fortunate to have access to a range of unique and comprehensive data sets that provide
me with disaggregate level data that allows me to track variables by drug (i), therapeutic
market or indication (j), in quarter (t). Data on FDA approvals by molecule and disease
come from BioMedTracker, a competitive intelligence and investment analytics database
developed by the Business Intelligence Division of Informa PLC. Data on sales by molecule
spanning 2002-2010 are from IMS. Data is limited to those drugs in the IMS sales data that
can be matched to the BioMedTracker indication and regulatory approval data. Furthermore,
because I am interested in sales at the drug-indication level, this further limited the sample.
All drugs that had only one indication approved are included, as it is assumed that all United
States sales of these drugs are for the one approved indication. To include those drugs with
more than one indication, I relied on an IMS dataset that summarizes prescribing behavior
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for each drug. In divvying up the sales from the IMS data into sales by drug and indication,
I calculated the percentage of prescriptions by indication for that drug in that year and
applied this to the IMS sales data to calculated the total amount of sales by indication.
Prior to 2002 (the year the data begins), there were 70 unique molecules approved within
the L1, L2, and L3 ATC drug classes with several molecules treating more than one disease.
For example, Taxol was approved to treat ovarian cancer in 1992, breast cancer in 1994,
and non-small cell lung cancer in 1999. A list of all indications and the number of drugs
approved for treatment prior to 2002 is presented in Table 4.1. While the majority treat a
type of cancer, other related conditions (including endometriosis, uterine fibroids, and HPV)
are also within the L-class of drugs.
Furthermore, there is some heterogeneity in the way with which different ATC classes
grow over time. For example, the largest class of drugs, the Alkylating agents (L1A0) saw no
new FDA approvals between 2002-2010. This is likely because it is one of the older classes of
cancer drugs, many of which were already off patent or coming off patent during the relevant
time period. In contrast, the A-Neo Protein Kinase Inhibitors (L1X4) while still a relatively
small subgroup saw considerable growth during the time period. Despite having received
only one FDA approval prior to 2002, by 2010 there were 8 total approvals. See Table 4.2
for a timeline of approvals by ATC4 group.
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Table 4.1: Full List of Indications with Approval
Pre-2002
Indication Number Approved
Actinic Keratoses 1
Acute Lymphocytic Leukemia (ALL) 3
Acute Myelogenous Leukemia (AML) 2
Acute Promyelocytic Leukemia (APL) 2
Adrenocortical Cancer 1
Bone Complications (including bone metastases) 1
Bone Marrow Transplant and Stem Cell Transplant 1
Brain Cancer (Malignant Glioma; AA and glioblastoma (GBM)) 2
Breast Cancer 11
Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia (CLL) 3
Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia (CML) 3
Colorectal Cancer (CRC) 3
Cushing’s Syndrome 1
Cutaneous T-Cell Lymphoma (CTCL) - NHL 2
Endometriosis 4
Hairy Cell Leukemia 1
Hematologic Cancer 1
Hodgkin’s Lymphoma 4
Human papillomavirus (HPV) Treatment (Antiviral) 1
Kaposi’s Sarcoma 2
Multiple Myeloma (MM) 3
Multiple Sclerosis (MS) 3
Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer (NSCLC) 3
Ovarian Cancer 4
Pancreatic Cancer 1
Prostate Cancer 10
Renal Cell Cancer (RCC) 1
Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) 1
Sickle Cell Anemia 1
Skin Cancer - Basal Cell Carcinoma (BCC) 1
Small Cell Lung Cancer (SCLC) 1
Solid Tumors 1
Testicular Cancer 1
Uterine Fibroids 3
This table presents a list of all indications and the number of molecules approved for their treat-
ment prior to 2002. Data from BioMedTracker.
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There is considerable heterogeneity in the proportion of sales captured by an ATC4 class
during the time period as illustrated in Table 4.3. Demand for branded Alkylating agents
(L1A0) shrunk over time as these drugs faced increased competition by generic manufacturers
and new technologies in other classes. Class L1X4 grew as expected given the large increased
of approved drugs joining the sample. But demand for drug classes that did not see new
entrants over the time period also grew. For example, the Cytostatic Aromatase Inhibitors
(L2B3) saw substantial demand increases despite a lack of new entrants.
4.5 Empirical Results
4.5.1 Impacts of drug repurposing on focal firm sales
As a firm receives a new indication approval for an already approved drug, one expects
to see all sales of the drug increase, due to new prescriptions for the drug to treat the
newest approved disease. However, one may also see increased sales of the drug for its other
approved indications as well. This would happen if there were spillover effects from the
announcement of the new approval, as explained in Proposition 2. To explore this, I look
at sales of exapanded drugs by indication over time. Here, I am constrained to those drugs
which have the data by indication.
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Table 4.4 presents regression results from Equation 4.1. The dependent variable across
all four models is Quantity or the log of total standard units sold by firm i, treating in-
dication j, in quarter t. Standard errors are clustered at the drug-indication level. The
coefficients on Price and Off-Patent are negative, as expected. Likewise, the coefficient on
Lag Advertising is positive, again, as expected. Across all four models the coefficient on the
variable of interest, Own Drug Repurposed, is positive and significant at the 1 percent level.
This suggests that sales for indication j increase when the firm receives a new approval for
indication k 6= j. In other words, there are positive spillovers within a drug when it receives
additional approvals for new indications. In my prior rubric, the sales of Drug B treating
indication j increase after Drug B receives approval to treat indication k 6= j.
4.5.2 Impacts of repurposing on competitors
In the previous section I determined that when Drug B was repurposed to treat indication
k 6= j, there were positive spillovers in the treatment of indication j. Are these spillover
effects self-contained to Drug B or do these spillovers impact competitor drugs that also treat
indication j? I define direct competitors as those drugs within the same ATC4 therapeutic
market that have been approved by the FDA for the same indication. For example, in the
breast cancer market (ATC4 market L2B3) the three aromatase inhibitors Femara (Novartis),
Arimidex (AstraZeneca), and Aromasin (Pfizer) are all direct competitors. Thus, I am
interested in whether a repurposing of Arimidex into a new indication has any spillover
effects on Femara or Aromasin in the aromatase inhibitor market.
Table 4.5 presents regression estimates from Equation 4.2. The dependent variable across
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Figure 4.2: Sales data from IMS.
Figure 4.3: Sales data from IMS.
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Table 4.4: Effect of Drug Repurposing on Quantity Sold
2002-2010
Dependent Variable: Log(Quantity Sold)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Price) -0.829∗∗∗ -0.844∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗ -0.758∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Own Drug Repurposed 2.125∗∗∗ 2.206∗∗∗ 2.077∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.51) (0.50)
Number of Competitors 0.304∗∗ -0.0878 0.131
(0.14) (0.16) (0.15)
log(Lagged Ad Spending) 0.362∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)
Off Patent -1.396∗∗∗
(0.25)
Indication FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Indication x Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 3153 3153 2327 2327
R2 0.643 0.644 0.709 0.731
First-stage F-stat 14.68 14.63 12.78 13.40
Robust standard errors in parantheses are clustered at the Drug-Indication
level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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all four models remains Quantity or the log of total standard units sold by firm i, treating
indication j, in quarter t. Standard errors are clustered at the drug-indication level. All
coefficients on the controls continue to have the expected sign. The coefficient on the variable
of interest, Competitor Drug Repurposed, is positive and significant. This suggests that as
a firm repurposes their drug in market k 6= j, this leads to an increase in sales of their
competitors in the original market j. In the context of the above example, as Arimidex
expands into market k 6= j, sales of Femara increase in market j.
Combined with the results in the prior section, it appears that as a drug is repurposed
into market k 6= j, there are positive spillovers to the both the focal drug and competitor
drugs within the original market j. Thus, Proposition 1 is not supported and while I see an
increase in sales of Drug B for indication j, they do not appear to come at the cost of sales
of Drug A. As such, Proposition 2 is also not supported.
4.5.3 Strategic preemption by competitors
While both the sales of Drug B and Drug A have been shown to increase for the treatment of
indication j, they could be doing so for different reasons. With the expansion of Drug B into
the treatment of indication k 6= j, it is possible that Firm A engaged in some type of strategic
preemption. To investigate this possibility, I consider two additional analyses exploring the
effect of a drug’s repurposing on price and advertising spend of their competitors. First,
I explore if the acquisition of a newly approved indication leads competitors to lower their
price. In Table 4.6, Model 1 I re-estimate Equation 4.2 replacing the dependent variable with
log(Price)ijt or the log of drug price for indication i, in market j at time t. The variable
134
Table 4.5: Effect of Competitor Repurposing on Quantity Sold
2002-2010
Dependent Variable: Log(Quantity Sold)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Price) -0.858∗∗∗ -0.868∗∗∗ -0.764∗∗∗ -0.800∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Own Drug Repurposed 2.399∗∗∗ 2.442∗∗∗ 2.433∗∗∗ 2.300∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.27) (0.61) (0.53)
Competitor Drug Repurposed 0.602∗ 0.538∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.258∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33)
Number of Competitors 0.272∗ -0.173 0.0494
(0.14) (0.17) (0.16)
log(Lagged Ad Spending) 0.381∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)
Off Patent -1.463∗∗∗
(0.25)
Indication FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Indication x Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 3153 3153 2327 2327
R2 0.642 0.643 0.713 0.736
First-stage F-stat 14.63 14.58 12.77 13.40
Robust standard errors in parantheses are clustered at the Drug-Indication level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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of interest is Competitor Drug Repurposed and the coefficient is expected to be negative if
firms preemptively act by lowering price.
Instead of changing price, firms could decide to increase their advertising expenditures,
which has been shown to be effective both in doctors (e.g., Larkin et al., 2017) and in patients
(e.g., Sinkinson and Starc, 2019). In this case, as Drug B expands to treat indication k 6= j
(along with the original indication j), Firm A increases their advertising spend on Drug A
for the treatment of indication j. I explore this possibility in Table 4.6, Models 2 and 3 where
I again re-estimate Equation 4.2 replacing the dependent variable with Advertising and Lag
Advertising, respectively. The variable of interest is Competitor Drug Repurposed and the
coefficient is expected to be positive if firms preemptively act by increasing advertising.
Results are presented in Table 4.6. The coefficients on the control variables are as one
would predict. The coefficient estimates for Off-Patent are worth mentioning as they may
seem counterintuitive. In Model 1, I see that effect of generic entry has a positive effect on
price. This effect is well documented in the literature (Frank and Salkever, 1997; Regan,
2008); firms often raise price to capture increased rents from the price-insensitive customers
who prefer branded products. In Models 2 and 3, I see negative effects on advertising; as
generics enter the market, firms begin to decrease advertising since substitution laws will
allow insurance companies to move patients to generic products.
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I do not see, in any of the models, the coefficients for the variable of interest, Competitor
Drug Repurposed, respond in a way that is predicted above. It suggests that the demand
expansion for Drug A as Drug B is repurposed into indication k 6= j is not due to preemptive
activities by Firm A. In short, Proposition 3 is not supported. Interestingly, the coefficients
were both the opposite of what would have been predicted. In Model 1 I see that the price
of Drug A increases as Drug B expands into indication k 6= j. Additionally, in Models 2
and 3, it appears that advertising expenditures decline. Combined with my prior results,
an interesting picture is beginning to emerge for Drug A as Drug B is repurposed. That is,
one observes increases in demand and price and decreases in advertising for Drug A in the
treatment of indication j as Drug B expands into indication k 6= j. In the next section I
discuss a scenario that can lead to this result.
4.5.4 Business stealing from distant (non-market) competitors
Thus far, I have documented both an expansion of Drug A and Drug B for the treatment of
indication j as Drug B expands into market k 6= j. This supports a halo effect for the entire
class of drugs that treat indication j. In other words, doctors or patients may have increased
demand for a class of drugs given the positive news surrounding alternative approved uses for
just one of the drugs. Importantly, this kind of spillover effect is supported in the literature
(e.g., Garthwaite, 2014; Shapiro, 2018; Sinkinson and Starc, 2019). This implies, however,
that the results are implying either an increase in new consumers or from business stealing
from among other drugs that treat the same indication but are in a different class of drugs
(i.e., the halo effect does not extend to them).
138
Recalling that the focus of this study is on markets that treat cancer, it is sensible to
assume that most rationale people diagnosed with cancer are likely to seek treatment. As
such, I believe it is less likely that this increase in demand is coming from patients who would
not have otherwise been treated for their cancer. This leaves us with the possibility that this
class of drugs is stealing business from other classes of drugs that treat the same indication.
For clarity, consider the following five drugs: Femara (Novartis), Arimidex (AstraZeneca),
Aromasin (Pfizer), Fareston (Kyowa Kirin) and Nolvadex (AstraZeneca). The first three
drugs are aromatase inhibitors while the last two drugs are anti-estrogens; all five drugs treat
breast cancer. Importantly for this analysis, the first three drugs are in ATC4 therapeutic
market L2B3 and the last two drugs are in ATC4 therapeutic market L2B1.
To test whether business stealing is occurring from other classes of drugs that treat the
same indication, I re-estimate Equation 4.2 in Table 4.7. The variable of interest is Same
Indication/Different Class Repurposed and an indicator that equals 1 if a drug treats the
same indication as drug i but resides in a different therapeutic class than the drug being
repurposed. In the above example, if Femera (ATC4 L2B3) was repurposed, then the variable
would equal one for the two drugs in market ATC4 L2B1 (i.e., Fareston and Nolvadex). In
the complete specification, Model 3, the coefficient on the variable of interest is negative and
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that the demand expansion I documented
previously is coming at the expense of these more distant or non-market competitors.
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4.5.5 Does drug repurposing impact firm performance?
The extent to which these demand changes impact firm performance should be reflected in
focal firm equity performance. As such, I follow McWilliams and Siegel (1997) and use an
event-study analysis to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). I estimate a market
model over a period of 250 days prior to the event date, t = 0, defined as the approval date
by the FDA for a new indication. Over a three-day event window (t-1 to t+1) I find an
average CAR of 1.52 percent, significant at the 1 percent level. When I multiply this by
market capitalization data from Compustat this translates into approximately $1.4 billion.
I argue that this monetized value of the abnormal return represents the unexpected
change in the discounted value of future cash flows of the focal drug, Drug B. These cash
flows are anticipated to come from several sources. First, there will be the direct impact on
the focal firm, Firm B, as they repurpose Drug B for a new indication, k 6= j. Second, given
the regulatory structure in place, a new indication provides three additional years of data
exclusivity thereby directly increasing the value Drug B in treating the original indication
j. Finally, as discussed above, there can be positive spillovers for Drug B in treating the
original indication j as well as increases in sales due to business stealing from firms outside
of the ATC therapeutic market that sell drugs for indication j.
4.6 Robustness Tests
One possible concern of this study is that the results I am seeing are capturing unobservable
changes of use within the ATC-4 class over time and that these results unrelated to one class
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member’s repurposing. To explore this further, I re-estimate the regression specifications
using a set of “placebo” indications within the relevant ATC-4 class. These placebo groups
include all indications within the relevant ATC-4 class that are unrelated to the newly
repositioned focal drug. For example, consider Erbitux, a drug initially approved for the
treatment of colorectal cancer which was later approved in 2006 to treat Head and Neck
cancer. Since Erbitux resides in ATC class L1X3, I would initially have been interested in
the growth of sales for colorectal cancer for both Erbitux and its competitors in class L1X3
following the drug’s reposition.
To test the robustness of my findings, I consider what happens to sales of unrelated
drug-indications within the relevant ATC class. A finding of positive sales growth among
unrelated indications would suggest that the above findings were driven by factors beyond
the effects of repurposing. To do this, I create a placebo “treatment” group where a drug
is treated if it is approved for indication l 6= j 6= k but in the same ATC4 class as drug i
that expanded into indication k. I then rerun Equation 4.2 on this new “treatment” group.
Results are presented in Table 4.8. The small and statistically insignificant coefficients on
Placebo Competitor suggest that the key results are not driven by unobserved changes within
the competitor class.
4.7 Concluding Remarks
This article provides fresh insight into how an increase of a product’s scope can change
demand for both it and its close competitors. This study looks specifically the repurposing
of a pharmaceutical drug, that is, the case where a company finds new uses for an already
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Table 4.8: Effect of Competitor Expansion on Quantity Sold
With “Placebo” Competitors
2002-2010
Dependent Variable: Log(Quantity Sold)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Price) -0.778∗∗∗ -0.790∗∗∗ -0.790∗∗∗ -0.738∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Placebo Competitor -0.153 -0.114 0.143 -0.129
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21)
Number of Competitors 0.222 0.390∗∗∗ 0.153
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Off Patent -1.095∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.26)
log(Lagged Ad Spending) 0.295∗∗∗
(0.05)
Indication FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Indication x Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 3278 3278 3278 2346
R2 0.641 0.641 0.659 0.734
Robust standard errors in parantheses are clustered at the Drug-Indication
level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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approved therapy. I find that as the company provides proof of additional uses it not only
leads to increased sales for its original uses, but that this excess demand spills over to its
closest competitors. Additional exploration suggests that this excess demand is from business
stealing from its competitors further away in compound similarity.
These findings certainly have implications for drug development and the strategies of
pharmaceutical firms. While the approval of a new use for an already marketed drug does not
generate as much attention as the approval of a new molecule, I find that these supplementary
approvals appear to make doctors and patients more likely to choose that therapy for its
other approved diseases than they were prior to the supplementary approval. Furthermore,
their close competitors appear to also achieve some benefits from this. One hypothesized
reason would be that additional approvals to even one drug in the class leads to greater
legitimacy of that chemical subgroup.
While I believe these results will generalize to industries beyond the pharmaceutical
industry, it will be important to better understand when these positive demand spillovers do
and do not apply to increases in product scope. I will leave these issues to future research.
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Appendix A
A.1 Data Description
The main data source used in this study comes from BioMedTracker, a competitive intelli-
gence and investment analytics database developed by the Business Intelligence Divison of
Informa PLC. BioMedTracker is a subscription service marketed to pharmaceutical compa-
nies and investment analysts seeking a centralized service tracking product development and
regulatory events in the industry.
To access and clean the data for this study, I used BioMedTracker to search for any
drug development events that occured between 1990 to present day. While this study uses
the date of completition of Phase II clinical trials as the relevant date for most analyses,
because the BioMedTracker database does not always have complete date information about
every drug, by searching for any event this allowed me to collect information on any drug
developed by any company with any date-based information. I then dropped any generic
products. This resulted in a dataset of over 41,000 drug-indication observations.
If a product was missing information on the date in which is Phase II trials ended and it
began Phase III clinical trials, I used the start of Phase III clinical trials as the relevant date.
For those that did not continue to Phase III and had a missing end of Phase II date, I used
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additional sources including EvaluatePharma, ClinicalTrials.gov, and textual information
from BioMedTracker to search for and fill in missing dates. In total, I supplemented dates
for 3,230 projects.
A.2 Variable Definitions and Construction
Dependent Variable
Pr(Phase III | Phase II). This is a binary variable equal to 1 if the molecule i went to
Phase III trials for indication j given it had been in Phase II. As described in the framework
above, Phase III trials are often just larger (but much more expensive) versions of Phase II
trials. By conditioning on Phase II participation, one can control for some of the selection
effects occurring up until Phase II. In particular, molecules beginning Phase II are generally
considered safe in the therapeutic dose.
Independent Variables
Post-rejection. This is the coefficient of interest: an indicator equal to 1 if the project (on
a unique molecule) completes Phase II clinical trials following an FDA rejection. I consider
only those projects using a different molecule to mitigate any effects from direct knowledge
spillovers. To explore the effects of rejection over time, I will first consider only the projects
immediately following failure, and then consider the effect on several projects in the future.
Leading Indication. This is an indicator equal to 1 if the indication being pursued
is the “leading indication” for that drug. Firms designate leading indications to be the one
they believe is most promising for the molecule, and therefore, it is the project to first begin
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extensive clinical trials. One would expect a higher probability of continuation for products
containing leading indications, all else equal.
Number of Indications. This is a count of the number of indications a firm is pur-
suing for the molecule. As described previously, a firm expecting to benefit from knowledge
spillovers may be less likely to terminate following Phase II. In the estimation, I consider the
product of Leading Indication and Number of Indications as measuring the full potential for
knowledge spillovers.
ODA. This is an indicator equal to 1 if the drug has received an Orphan Drug desig-
nation. Because designated orphan drugs accrue additional benefits (like shorter Phase III
trials and tax credits on R&D expenditures), a firm may be more likely to pursue a drug
with that designation than the same drug not receiving a designation. However, orphan
drugs by definition are targeting smaller markets, which may make them less desirable than
a molecule targeting a large but under-served population. Orphan drugs constitute 12.6%
of drug-indication pairs in this sample.
Fasttrack. This is an indicator equal to 1 if the drug has been designated for fast-track
approval by the FDA. These drugs are potentially of higher quality and will often have shorter
Phase III trials and faster review times (Thaul, 2008). They also may command higher
revenues because they are serving an unmet need. To receive a Fast-track designation, the
drug must both address a serious or life-threatening condition and address an unmet medical
need. I expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive and significant. 12.2% of this
sample contains drugs with Fast-track status.
Breakthrough. This is an indicator equal to 1 if the drug has received a Breakthrough
Therapy Designation. Products receiving a Breakthrough Therapy Designation have dis-
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played clinical evidence to provide noted improvement over already marketed therapies. Like
Fasttrack products, benefits include shorter clinical trials, shorter regulatory review times,
and increased interaction with the FDA. Preliminary evidence suggests products receiving a
Breakthrough Therapy Designation have shorter clinical development times by nearly 30%
(Chandra et al., 2019). Breakthrough designations are difficult to obtain, and constitute
4.4% of this sample. I expect the coefficient on breakthrough drugs to be positive and
significant.
Num Competitors. This is the number of approved drugs on the market to treat
indication j at time t. Because there is a strong first-mover advantage in this industry,
many firms consider their expected market share when considering the upside of investment.
Past Experience. This is a cumulative count of total Investigative New Drug Applica-
tions (INDs) that firm r has filed at time t. This controls for a firm’s experience level, given
past research has demonstrated that less experienced firms can be less likely to terminate
development projects (Guedj and Scharfstein, 2004) and that past experience is valuable for
clinical trial success (Danzon et al., 2005; Macher and Boerner, 2006). INDs are usually filed
right before a firm conducts Phase I clinical trials. This is similar to a measure employed by
Allain et al. (2016) to control for experience between pharmaceutical firms in their study on
the timing of molecule licensing.
Avg Approval Phase III. This is the average probability of approval for a drug in
its therapeutic class as collected and reported by BioMedTracker. Drugs with historically
higher average probabilities of approval should be more likely to continue to Phase III trials,
all else equal. This will fall out of the specifications containing indication fixed effects.
Molecule Type. This is a vector of fixed effects for 20 different types of molecule
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formulations, ranging from traditional small molecules, to peptides and gene therapies.
Indication. This is a vector of 546 indication fixed effects. Because an indication is
directly linked to demand, these fixed effects (along with the number of competitors) will
proxy for potential revenue. A firm can expect to sell more drugs if they are developing a
drug for a more common indication.
Year. This is a vector of fifteen year-specific fixed effects for the year at the end of
Phase II clinical trials. These control for any macro-trends in the way in which companies
make decisions about Phase III clinical trials. For example, if techniques for judging the
quality of drugs at Phase II get better over time, this may result in all firms pursuing fewer
Phase III clinical trials over time. Year fixed effects mitigate the possibility of conflating
these macro-level trends with the effects of the treatment.
Drug Classification. This is a vector of fixed effects for three types of drug classifica-
tions: new molecular entities (NMEs), NDAs and sNDAs, biologics, and vaccines.
Company. This is a vector of 1,571 company fixed effects including both pharmaceuti-
cal and biotechnology companies. These control for unobserved heterogeneity in initial risk
attitudes for firms in my sample. This is important given past research on the heterogeneity
among firm capabilities in innovation (Arora et al., 2009; Eggers, 2012), capabilities in termi-
nation (Guler, 2018), and the potential for resource redeployment (Lieberman et al., 2017).
Additionally, research exploring investment decisions on characteristics of pharmaceutical
firms has demonstrated certain firms are inherently more risk averse than others (Guedj and
Scharfstein, 2004).1
1See Appendix A.3 for an analysis demonstrating a positive correlation between firm experience and the
capability of “failing fast” in this sample.
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A.3 Ability to Terminate as a Capability
In this paper, I provide evidence that large failures driven by feedback external to the
firm can impact a firm’s future innovation investment decisions. In particular, I show that
they terminate future projects earlier and this leads to higher rates of approval for those
projects that they do pursue. These findings may suggest that the ability to know when
to terminate is a dynamic capability that, if executed properly, could free up firm resources
for other projects. Therefore I want to explore the evidence that the ability to recognize
early on that a project will not be successful is a dynamic capability that can be acquired
and cultivated. The acquisition of capabilities has long been of interest to strategy scholars
(Barney, 1991; Ethiraj et al., 2005) and very recently, scholars have become interested in
the “capability to terminate.” In what may be the first paper to explore this capability,
Guler (2018) notes that the detection of failure itself is a capability often unaccounted for
in literature on organizational learning. Using data on venture capital firms, she finds firms
with a higher termination capabilities are also higher performers. To observe if this holds
within the pharmaceutical industry, I explore associations between termination capabilities
and innovation performance.
To analyze the associations between firm performance and the ability to terminate early,
one must first determine how to measure this capability. For this analysis, I examine how
long it takes a specific firm to terminate a project trial for a product in which they determined
to be unsuccessful. To do this, I consider all projects that reach at least Phase II clinical
trials. Recall that by Phase II, the firm has already determined that its product is not toxic
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to a small sample of healthy volunteers, but are looking to collect data on safety and efficacy
for sick volunteers. The choice to consider projects that made it at Phase II is largely one of
necessity because the data is more complete beginning in Phase II. As the dependent variable
in an OLS regression, I calculate how long it takes, in days, for the firm to terminate this
project. To measure firm performance, I consider the number of FDA approvals the firm has
within the disease class at the year of termination. I then classify high performing firms as
those that have a number of approvals above a certain threshold in that disease class in that
year. The estimated ordinary least squares model is presented in Equation A.1.
log(Time to Termination|Phase II) = α0 + βCapability + ΘX + τm + Φj + µt + ijrt (A.1)
Here, X is again vector of Project-time controls, and τm, Φj, and µt represent fixed effects
for molecule type, indication, and year respectively.
I consider four different measures for a firm’s capabilities at time t in a given therapeu-
tic class. I first consider the log of the number of approvals the firm has in the relevant
therapeutic class at start date of Phase II clinical trials (column 1). Secondly I consider
an indicator for whether or not, at time t, the firm is in the top 75% of firms by number
of FDA approved drugs in that class (column 2). Column 3 employs an indicator for firms
in the top 90% by therapeutic class. And finally, in column four I look at whether or not
the firm is public, and therefore likely has more aggregate experience and success in taking
drugs through clinial trials.
In addition to these measures of firm capabilities, X is a vector of project characteristics
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that include indicators for whether or not the drug has received any beneficial status from
the government (Orphan Drug, Fasttrack, or Breakthrough), the number of indications it is
pursuing, and whether or not it is the first indication to enter Phase II trials (if it is targeting
multiple indications). All of these factors could potentially impact a firm’s incentives to
terminate a project, all else equal. Molecule Type, Drug Classification, and Indication
are all product-level fixed effects. Also included is a vector of year fixed effects for the
year of termination. This should control for any macro-level conditions or information that
incentivised firms to terminate.
Table A1 presents the results from this estimation, under the four different measures of
a high performing firm. These estimates provide some evidence that there is an association
between firm performance (as measured in FDA approved products) and its ability to ter-
minate a project more quickly. Specifically, a 1% increase in approved molecules for that
therapeutic class leads to a 2.5% reduction in days in advanced clinical trials. Firms in the
top 75% of the distribution of FDA approvals for a therapeutic class spend nearly 8% less
time in clinical trials, and those in the top 90% spend over 10% less time. Public firms in
general spend 12% fewer days in advanced clinical trials. In addition, the coefficients on all
other variables coincide with what one would expect. Molecules that have beneficial status
(Orphan Drug, Breakthrough Designation, or Fasttrack Designation) spend a longer time in
clinical trials all else equal, likely because the benefits of approval are greater or the costs
of development are lower. Leading indications and molecules with multiple indications also
spend significantly longer, likely because the learning benefits of clinical trials are greater
for these products.
While these findings cannot be interpreted causally, they add additional evidence to the
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Table A1: Time to Termination
2000-2018
Dependent Variable: Log(Number of Days in Phase II)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capability Definition: log(Approvals) Top 75% Top 90% Public
Capability -0.0242∗∗∗ -0.0766∗∗∗ -0.104∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
ODA 0.252∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Breakthrough 0.302∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.261∗∗
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Fasttrack 0.347∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Lead Ind*Num Inds 0.0616∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗ 0.0695∗∗∗ 0.0716∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 5.221∗∗∗ 5.503∗∗∗ 5.635∗∗∗ 5.486∗∗∗
(0.43) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
Indication FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Molecule Type FE Y Y Y Y
DrugClass FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 4582 6058 6058 6058
R2 0.353 0.342 0.343 0.343
The dependent variable is the log of the number of days a product was in Phase II clinical
trials before voluntary termination by the firm. Capabilities are measured as follows: (1)
The log of the number of approvals the firm has in the relevant therapeutic class at start
date of Phase II clinical trials; (2) An indicator for whether or not, at time t, the firm is
in the top 75% percent of number of FDA approved drugs in that class; (3) An indicator
for the top 90% of number of FDA approved drugs in that class; (4) Whether or not the
firm is public, and therefore likely has more experience taking drugs through clinical trials.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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results presented by Guler (2018) showing the ability to terminate quickly may be a dynamic
capability associated with a competitive advantage. Furthermore, it supports findings by
Guedj and Scharfstein (2004) that younger firms (who have possibly not yet developed this
capability) will hold onto innovation projects longer for lack of a better outside option.
A.4 Effect of Failure Given Capabilities
One characteristic of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries is the tendency for
firms to gravitate towards specializing in certain therapeutic areas. For example, large phar-
maceutical firm Allergan does the majority of its research in ophthalmology and neurology,
while small biotechnology firm SillaJen Biotherapeutics specializes exclusively in oncology.
Even large and historically successful pharmaceutical firms can terminate research for dis-
eases in which they grow to believe they lack capabilities. In 2018, the pharmaceutical com-
pany Pfizer garnered attention when they terminated all of their projects for Alzheimer’s
Disease, laying off over 300 people in their neuroscience division. In a statement, the com-
pany described it as “an exercise to re-allocate spending across our portfolio, to focus on
those areas where our pipeline, and our scientific expertise, is strongest” (Reuters, 2018).
There has been some recent significant research on the role that failure may play on
future firm behavior depending on whether or not the failed product was within a class in
which the firm had experience. Using data from the mutual fund industry, Eggers and Suh
(2019) find that failure in domains in which the firm is particularly inexperienced results in
retreat from creating new products in this domain, and toward those which they have more
experience. Conjointly, they find that failure in areas where the firm has experience does
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not cause these changes, likely because the firm may have a better understanding of what
caused the failure.
In this analysis, I explore if the effect of an FDA rejection is more pronounced on projects
in which the firm has had significant experience. To do this empirically, I create a variable
that flags the therapeutic class where the firm has most success. Recall that the data
divides up indications into 20 therapeutic classes. To determine where a firm is likely most
capable, I consider all of its Phase III clinical trials prior to receipt of the CRL and calculate
the percentage of those that were approved by class. I assume the two therapeutic classes
in which firms have the most approvals are their specialties. In the event of a tie, the
specialty is flagged as the therapeutic category with the highest percentage of Phase III
clinical trials that were approved. For example, this algorithm indicated Merck & Company’s
specialties to be “Infectious diseases” (where they had 11 approvals prior to their CRL) and
“Autoimmune/immunology” (six approvals). FDA rejections for drugs in a firm’s specialty
class account for roughly half of all rejections in the data. Table A2 displays the list of
therapeutic classes with the corresponding number of firms in my sample that have it flagged
as their specialty.
To test this, I re-estimate Equation 2.1 but with the addition of an interaction term for if
the firm’s FDA rejection was within a therapeutic class in which the majority of its approvals
are from. Table A3 displays the estimated coefficients.
These results do not completely coincide with those found in Eggers and Suh (2019) who
argue that “negative feedback in experienced domains... will not lead to a significant ad-
justment” (312) because organizations can rationalize those failures as aberrations. In Table
A3, the coefficients on Post-rejection x specialty are slightly positive though statistically in-
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Table A2: Number of Companies by Specialty
Therapeutic Class Number of Companies
Allergy 10
Autoimmune/immunology 50
Cardiovascular 47
Dermatology 14
ENT/Dental 1
Endocrine 52
Gastroenterology 17
Hematology 32
Infectious disease 70
Metabolic 25
Neurology 102
Obstetrics/Gynecology 3
Oncology 121
Ophthalmology 26
Orthopedics 2
Psychiatry 34
Renal 5
Respiratory 11
Rheumatology 6
Urology 6
This table counts the number of companies in the sample that
have the specified therapeutic class as their specialty given the
following algorithm: I assume the two therapeutic classes in
which firms have the most approvals are their specialties. I
also consider all of a firm’s Phase III clinical trials and cal-
culate the percentage of those that were approved by class.
In the event of a tie, the specialty is flagged as the therapeu-
tic category with the highest percentage of Phase III clinical
trials that were approved. Therapeutic Class is defined by
BioMedTracker.
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Table A3: The Probability of a Product in Phase II Continuing to Phase III
When Rejection is for Therapeutic Class in Firm’s Specialty
2000-2018
Dependent Variable: Continue to Phase III
(1) (2) (3)
Post-rejection x specialty 0.0915 0.0631 0.0509
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Post-rejection -0.112∗∗∗ -0.0950∗∗∗ -0.0994∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Indication FE N Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Molecule Type FE Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE Y Y Y
Company*Therapeutic Class FE N N Y
Observations 5938 5938 5938
R2 0.275 0.395 0.554
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product began Phase III clinical trials. Post-
rejection is an indicator equal to 1 if it was the next product to finish Phase II following
the receipt of a CRL for a different molecule in the therapeutic category for which it
has the most FDA approvals. Specialty class is an indicator equal to 1 if the rejection
was for a project within one of the two therapeutic classes in which firms have the
most approvals at time t. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the
Company*Therapeutic Class level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
158
significant. This suggets that a firm’s experience or capabilities may not insulate it from the
average effects of rejection on firm behavior. Given the setting of this study, this effect is not
entirely surprising. A firm likely expects occasional poor performance in the mutual fund
industry, where they have little control over external forces. However, in this study, firms
submit an application to the FDA explicitly because they (and outside analysts) believe it
will be approved. This tension between beliefs and reality will likely cause a bigger response
from the firm regardless of whether or not the rejection was within a therapeutic class in
which they had considerable experience.
A.5 Timing of Termination Following Rejection
If the effect seen on future investment decisions following FDA rejection was a function of
only financial considerations, it is plausible that firms would begin terminating Phase II
clinical trials very shortly after the FDA rejection. Recall that the mechanism for the effect
proposed here is that following rejection, firms become less likely to continue in investing in
a product after seeing the Phase II data. To explore this rigorously, I analyse if the time
that terminated projects spent in Phase II after FDA rejection is statistically equivalent to
the time spent in Phase II clinical trials before rejection, ceteris paribus.
To test this, I consider how long it took a firm to terminate a project in Phase II trials,
provided that it was eventually terminated. I subset the data to those eventually terminated
Phase II clinical trials and calculate the log of the number of days spent in Phase II clinical
trials. I then run a regression with Log(Days in Phase II) as the dependent variable and an
indicator equal to 1 if the project was the next Phase II termination immediately following
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the FDA rejection. The fixed effects and relevant controls from the previous regressions are
also included. Results are presented in Table A4.
The coefficients on Post-rejection are all statistically insignificant from zero, suggesting
that there was no observable difference in the time to terminate Phase II projects just
following rejection from the FDA. In addition, the coefficients on the controls are directionally
as one would expect. For example, the coefficient on Lead Ind*Num Inds is positive. If a
firm is pursuing other indications for the same molecule, it will be more likely to hold onto a
project longer due to the possibility of acquiring additional information about the molecule
to be applied to other indications.
A.6 Exploring the Effect of Phase III Terminations fol-
lowing Abnormal Returns
In exploring the effects of phase III failures on future investment in product development,
I had considered all failed trials that had lasted longer than a certain threshold of time.
However, the endogeneity problems described in Section 2.5.2 could still be of concern in
this case and perhaps driving the “non-result” seen in Table 2.9. In this section, I will test
the robustness of this result by looking at those trials that lasted over 50% of the average
length of time within the class and resulted in abnormal negative returns to the company’s
stock. As described in Section 2.5.2, those failures that lead to a signifcantly large drop in
a company’s value may be plausibly the most “surprising”, both to investors and the firm.
To probe the robustness of the Phase III failure results, I first limit the sample to only
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Table A4: Time Terminated Projects are in Phase II Following FDA Rejection
2000-2018
Dependent Variable: log(Days in Phase II)
(1) (2) (3)
1 Product Later 2 Products Later 3 Products Later
Post-Rejection -0.00519 0.110 -0.0336
(0.15) (0.12) (0.12)
ODA 0.0923 0.0931 0.0930
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Breakthrough -0.215 -0.220 -0.216
(1.04) (1.04) (1.04)
Fasttrack 0.0874 0.0900 0.0870
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Lead Ind*Num Inds 0.0367∗∗∗ 0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0367∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Num Competitors 0.00130 0.00132 0.00130
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Past Experience -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0168∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 8.474∗∗∗ 8.525∗∗∗ 8.500∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.68) (0.67)
Year FE Y Y Y
Molecule Type FE Y Y Y
DrugClass FE Y Y Y
Company*Therapeutic Class FE Y Y Y
Observations 3054 3054 3054
R2 0.724 0.724 0.724
Post-rejection is an indicator equal to 1 if it was the next 1, 2 or 3 products to finish Phase II
following the receipt of a CRL and is not the same molecule as the failed product. Robust standard
errors in parentheses and clustered at Company*Therapeutic Class level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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those publically traded firms and the failed Phase III trials that lasted over 50% of the
average length of time within the class. By including only those failed trials that plaubily
lasted the full length of time, the amount spent on the drugs development will be nearly
in line with those drugs that received a CRL. This allows for a closer “apples to apples”
analysis of the differential effects of failure and rejection.
To build a dataset of surprising terminations, I use stock market data from CRSP and
consider only Phase III terminations that resulted in statistically significant negative ab-
normal returns. This results in a sample of 23 terminations. Then, using this sample of
terminations, I estimate regression Equation 2.3, where Post-termination = 1 if molecule i
treating indication j was the next project in the pipeline to finish Phase II clinical trials.
Table A5 displays the results. As in Table 2.9, the coefficient statistically insignificant from
0, suggesting no change in propensity to continue investing following these surprising Phase
III failures.
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Appendix B
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Table B1: Impact of Increased Demand on Change in Probability of
Investment in Phase III Clinical Trials
Logit DDD Mode
2000 - 2008
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received Phase III Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post 11.71∗∗∗ 11.24∗∗∗ 11.83∗∗∗ 25.70∗∗∗
(1.01) (1.13) (1.14) (1.94)
Medicare 0.617 0.529 0.758 0.882
(0.68) (0.69) (0.70) (0.95)
Payer 12.31∗∗∗ 11.95∗∗∗ 12.82∗∗∗ 26.80∗∗∗
(0.83) (0.89) (0.94) (1.82)
Post -1.771∗∗ -0.913 -1.284 -0.901
(0.82) (1.06) (1.06) (1.27)
Payer*Post -11.61∗∗∗ -11.11∗∗∗ -11.69∗∗∗ -25.84∗∗∗
(0.95) (1.04) (1.05) (1.95)
Medicare*Post -0.503 -0.268 -0.233 -0.378
(0.79) (0.81) (0.82) (1.10)
Medicare*Payer -12.01∗∗∗ -11.56∗∗∗ -12.31∗∗∗ -25.58∗∗∗
(0.86) (0.97) (0.99) (1.72)
Year FE N Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y Y Y
Company FE N N N Y
Observations 1779 1779 1773 1365
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product began Phase III clinical trials given
that it completed Phase II clinical trials. The variable Medicare is an indicator equal
to 1 if the disease being treated is one that will be subject to any Medicare Part D
reimbursement. This variable Payer is an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed
for the pharmacy, rather than hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal
to 1 if the Phase II trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA
was signed into law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January 1,
2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B2: Impact of Increased Demand on Change in Probability of
Approval Following Investment in Phase III Clinical Trials
Logit Model
2000 - 2008
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received FDA Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post -2.053∗ -2.153∗∗ -2.217∗∗ -2.738∗
(1.08) (1.08) (1.08) (1.55)
Medicare -1.042∗ -1.118∗ -0.892 -0.930
(0.62) (0.64) (0.65) (1.05)
Payer -1.522 -1.578 -1.390 -2.155
(0.99) (1.00) (0.93) (1.53)
Post -0.937 -0.938 -1.224 -1.109
(0.63) (0.78) (0.83) (1.13)
Payer*Post 2.141∗ 2.199∗∗ 2.353∗∗ 2.755∗
(1.11) (1.10) (1.08) (1.54)
Medicare*Post 0.814 0.935 0.917 0.730
(0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.84)
Medicare*Payer 1.390 1.489 1.416 2.227
(0.98) (0.97) (0.89) (1.48)
Year FE N Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y Y Y
Company FE N N N Y
Observations 994 994 994 846
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product was approved by the FDA
and 0 if it was terminated during or after Phase III clinical trials. The variable
Medicare is an indicator equal to 1 if the disease being treated is one that
will be subject to any Medicare Part D reimbursement. This variable Payer is
an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed for the pharmacy, rather than
hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal to 1 if the Phase II
trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA was signed into
law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January 1, 2006.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B3: Impact of Increased Demand on Change in Probability of
Investment in Phase III Clinical Trials
Logit DDD Mode
Dropping Oncology Projects
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received Phase III Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post 12.13∗∗∗ 11.00∗∗∗ 12.11∗∗∗ 26.55∗∗∗
(0.95) (1.34) (1.37) (2.00)
Medicare 0.396 0.330 0.560 0.500
(0.66) (0.73) (0.76) (0.98)
Payer 13.24∗∗∗ 12.15∗∗∗ 13.48∗∗∗ 27.87∗∗∗
(0.74) (1.01) (1.08) (1.95)
Post -1.919∗∗ -1.209 -1.521 -1.348
(0.81) (1.17) (1.17) (1.41)
Payer*Post -12.58∗∗∗ -11.35∗∗∗ -12.37∗∗∗ -27.12∗∗∗
(0.84) (1.15) (1.18) (2.07)
Medicare*Post -0.0408 0.168 0.171 0.0790
(0.78) (0.84) (0.86) (1.09)
Medicare*Payer -12.49∗∗∗ -11.40∗∗∗ -12.66∗∗∗ -26.40∗∗∗
(0.81) (1.22) (1.24) (1.80)
Year FE N Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y Y Y
Company FE N N N Y
Observations 1341 1303 1297 963
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product began Phase III clinical trials given
that it completed Phase II clinical trials. The variable Medicare is an indicator equal
to 1 if the disease being treated is one that will be subject to any Medicare Part D
reimbursement. This variable Payer is an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed
for the pharmacy, rather than hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal
to 1 if the Phase II trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA
was signed into law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January 1,
2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B4: Impact of Increased Demand on Change in Probability of
Approval Following Investment in Phase III Clinical Trials
Logit Model
Dropping Oncology Projects
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received FDA Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post -2.583∗∗ -2.539∗∗ -2.487∗∗ -3.564∗∗
(1.06) (1.05) (1.02) (1.52)
Medicare -1.056∗ -1.165∗ -0.913 -1.354
(0.61) (0.65) (0.66) (1.12)
Payer -1.764∗ -1.728∗ -1.460 -2.350
(0.97) (1.00) (0.92) (1.59)
Post -1.179∗ -1.267∗ -1.483∗ -1.666
(0.62) (0.75) (0.80) (1.15)
Payer*Post 2.383∗∗ 2.319∗∗ 2.414∗∗ 3.077∗
(1.10) (1.10) (1.07) (1.59)
Medicare*Post 1.199∗ 1.310∗∗ 1.193∗ 1.246
(0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.86)
Medicare*Payer 1.674∗ 1.653∗ 1.483 2.780∗
(0.97) (0.98) (0.90) (1.54)
Year FE N Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y Y Y
Company FE N N N Y
Observations 808 808 808 685
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product was approved by the FDA
and 0 if it was terminated during or after Phase III clinical trials. The variable
Medicare is an indicator equal to 1 if the disease being treated is one that
will be subject to any Medicare Part D reimbursement. This variable Payer is
an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed for the pharmacy, rather than
hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal to 1 if the Phase II
trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA was signed into
law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January 1, 2006.
Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B5: Impact of Increased Demand on Change in Probability of
Investment in Phase III Clinical Trials and Probability of Approval
Logit Model
Dropping Oncology Projects
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received Phase III Investment
Fewer than 6 Divisions 6 or More Divisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post 11.68∗∗∗ 27.98∗∗∗ -14.27∗∗∗ -14.39∗∗∗
(2.14) (3.13) (2.25) (1.43)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y N Y
Company FE N Y N Y
Observations 413 287 562 555
Dependent Variable: Indicator equal to 1 if Received FDA Approval
Fewer than 6 Divisions 6 or More Divisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Medicare*Payer*Post -1.876 -0.771 -3.326∗ -3.885∗∗
(1.74) (2.02) (1.73) (1.80)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Drug Classification FE N Y N Y
Company FE N Y N Y
Observations 331 200 477 477
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a product began Phase III clinical trials given
that it completed Phase II clinical trials. The variable Medicare is an indicator equal
to 1 if the disease being treated is one that will be subject to any Medicare Part D
reimbursement. This variable Payer is an indication equal to 1 if the drug is designed
for the pharmacy, rather than hospital, market. The variable Post is an indicator equal
to 1 if the Phase II trial ends after November 23, 2003, the date in which the MMA
was signed into law. Note that Medicare Part D did not go into effect until January 1,
2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at firm level.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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